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Abstract
We provide two extensions of Gilboa and Schmeidler (J Math Econ 18:141–153,
1989)’s maxmin expected utility decision rule to accommodate a decision maker’s
changing ambiguity attitudes. The two rules are, respectively, a weighted maxmin rule
and a variant constraint rule. The former evaluates an act by a weighted average of its
worst and best possible expected utilities over a set of priors, with the weights depend-
ing on the act. The latter evaluates an act by its worst expected utility over a neighbor-
hood of a set of approximating priors, with the size of the neighborhood depending on
the act. Canonical representations of the two rules are provided for classes of preference
relations that exhibit, respectively, ambiguity aversion à la Schmeidler (Econometrica
57:571–587, 1989) and ambiguity aversion à la Ghirardato and Marinacci (J Econ
Theory 102:251–289, 2002). In the second part of this paper, we study wealth effect
under ambiguity. We propose axioms on absolute and relative ambiguity aversion and
derive three representations for the ambiguity averse preference relations exhibiting
decreasing (increasing) absolute ambiguity aversion. In particular, decreasing absolute
ambiguity aversion implies that as the baseline utility of an act increases, a weighted
maxmin decision maker puts less weight on the worst case, and a variant constraint
decision maker considers a smaller neighborhood of approximating priors.
Keywords Ambiguity · Ambiguity averse preferences · Weighted maxmin
representation · Variant constraint representation · Decreasing absolute ambiguity
aversion · Increasing relative ambiguity aversion · Wealth effect
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1 Introduction
A decision maker makes choices facing unknown states of the world as well as
unknown probability distributions of the states. Such a situation is called Knightian
uncertainty (Knight 1921) or ambiguity. It is different from a situation of risk in which
the states are unknown, but the probability distribution is known. The decision maker
has a preference relation over acts that yield state-contingent outcomes. A well-known
decision rule axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is the maxmin expected
utility (MEU) rule (see also Wald 1950a, b). A MEU decision maker evaluates an act
f by
min
p∈D E pu( f ),
where D is a set of priors over the states, u is a utility function over outcomes, and
E pu( f ) denotes the expected utility of the act f with respect to a prior p. The decision
maker behaves as if he regards all priors in D as possible and pessimistically evaluates
an act by its worst possible expected utility.
The MEU decision rule is a prominent rule that captures a decision maker’s aversion
to ambiguity. However, by considering always the worst case, it does not accommodate
the possibility that a decision maker has changing ambiguity attitudes. For an example,
imagine that a decision maker chooses, in the face of two unknown states, one from
the following two acts that are parameterized by t ≥ 0. The first act is ambiguous,
yielding 100+t dollars in state 1 and t dollars in state 2. The second act is unambiguous,
yielding 45+t dollars in both states. Assume that the decision maker is risk neutral and
believes that the probability of state 1 is between 0.4 and 0.6. Thus, the worst expected
payoff of the unambiguous act is 45 + t and that of the ambiguous act is 40 + t .
According to the MEU decision rule, regardless of the value of t , the unambiguous
act is better than the ambiguous one. However, as analogous to the wealth effect under
risk, people may tend to be less averse to ambiguity when the baseline payoff of an
act increases. In particular, the decision maker may choose the unambiguous act when
t = 0 and choose the ambiguous act when t = 1000. Similar behavioral patterns that
reveal a decision maker’s changing degrees of ambiguity aversion are well evidenced
in the systematically designed experiments studied by Baillon and Placido (2015).
The MEU decision rule does not accommodate such behavior patterns. Therefore, we
consider in this paper two extensions of the MEU decision rule.
The first extension is a generalized Hurwicz rule, or a weighted maxmin (WM)
decision rule. A WM decision maker evaluates an act f by
λ(u( f )) min
p∈D E pu( f ) + (1 − λ(u( f ))) maxp∈D E pu( f ),
where D and u are the same as in the MEU rule, and λ is a function that depends on
utility profiles induced by acts and takes its values in [0, 1]. We call D an admissible
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set of priors, or simply an admissible set, and λ a weight function. A WM decision
maker behaves as if he considers not only the worst possible expected utility but also
the best, and evaluates an act by a weighted average of the worst and best expected
utilities. Different from the MEU rule, the weight on the worst case is not a constant
equal to 1. Instead, it depends on acts. Smaller weights correspond to less ambiguity
aversion. When the weight goes to 1, the decision maker becomes optimistic and thus
exhibits ambiguity loving.
A WM decision rule typically has more than one representations given by different
admissible sets. Indeed, for each superset of D, we can use the same u and an adjusted
weight function to generate the same value for each act, so that they constitute an
alternative representation of the same preference relation. Each admissible set gives
rise to an upper bound and a lower bound of the value of each act. We are interested in
finding the smallest admissible set since it provides the tight bounds and gives a natural
normalization in view of the nesting property of the admissible sets. We call a WM
representation that has the smallest admissible set a canonical WM representation.
Ghirardato et al. (2004) also introduce a WM decision rule with a representation
that has a particular admissible set. The two representations are different in general.
A preference relation that admits their WM representation may not admit a canonical
WM representation. Moreover, when a preference relation admits both representations,
their admissible set may not be the smallest. See Sect. 3.1.1 for examples. However,
when restricted to the class of so-called ambiguity averse preference relations in the
literature, the two representations coincide.
More precisely, an ambiguity averse preference relation is one that satisfies some
basic axioms and exhibits ambiguity aversion à la Schmeidler (1989), which we call
S-ambiguity aversion. Our first main result shows that a preference relation is an
ambiguity averse preference relation if and only if it admits a canonical WM repre-
sentation in which the weight function satisfies some properties. Moreover, in this case,
the smallest admissible set agrees with the admissible set in the WM representation
studied by Ghirardato et al. (2004).
The second extension of the MEU rule is a variant of the constraint decision rule
that is introduced by Hansen and Sargent (2001) as one of their two robust decision
rules. A variant constraint (VC) decision maker evaluates an act f by
min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(u( f )) E pu( f ),
where u and  are the same as before, K is a set of priors, d(p, K ) is the Euclidean
distance between the prior p and the set K , and σ is a function that depends on utility
profiles induced by acts and takes non-negative real values. We call K an essential set
of priors, or simply an essential set, and σ a constraint function. A VC decision maker
behaves as if he considers the priors in the essential set K as best approximations of the
true prior, while he is also concerned with potential misspecification of approximating
priors. Thus, the decision maker considers a neighborhood of the essential set and
evaluates an act by its worst expected utility with respect to the priors in the neighbor-
hood. Importantly, the size of the neighborhood, specified by σ , depends on the act in
consideration. Larger values of σ correspond to less concern about misspecification of
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approximating priors. When σ goes to 0, the decision maker only considers approx-
imating priors and is not at all concerned about potential misspecification. When the
constraint function σ is constant, the VC decision rule reduces to a MEU decision
rule.
Similar to a WM decision rule, a VC decision rule typically has more than one
representations. Indeed, for each subset of K , we can use the same u and an adjusted
constraint function to generate the same value for each act, so that they constitute
an alternative representation of the same preference relation. In light of the nesting
property of the essential sets, we are interested in finding the largest one as a normal-
ization. We call a VC representation that has the largest essential set a canonical VC
representation.
While our first main result provides canonical WM representations for preference
relations exhibiting S-ambiguity aversion, our second main result provides canonical
VC representations for those exhibiting a different type of ambiguity aversion à la
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), which we call GM-ambiguity aversion. Based on a
notion of comparative ambiguity aversion, Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) say that a
preference relation is ambiguity averse if it is more ambiguity averse than a subjective
expected utility (SEU) preference relation. We show that a preference relation satisfies
some basic axioms and exhibits GM-ambiguity aversion if and only if it admits a
canonical VC representation in which the constraint function satisfies a monotonicity
property. Moreover, we show that the largest essential set for a preference relation is
the set of all subjective priors of the SEU preference relations that are less ambiguity
averse than the one in consideration.
Neither the class of preference relations admitting canonical WM representations
includes the class of preference relations admitting canonical VC representations, nor
the reverse. Since S-ambiguity aversion does not imply GM-ambiguity aversion, by
our two representation results, there are preferences admitting canonical WM repre-
sentations but not canonical VC representations. Conversely, we provide an example
of a preference relation that admits a canonical VC representation but not a canonical
WM representation. When a preference relation admits both types of representations,
we show that the largest essential set is always a subset of the smallest admissible set.
Moreover, the MEU preference relations are characterized by the coincidence of the
largest essential set with the smallest admissible set.
After studying two extensions of the MEU decision rule that accommodate chang-
ing ambiguity attitudes, we focus in the second part of the paper on ambiguity averse
preference relations that exhibit a particular pattern of changing ambiguity aversion.
More precisely, we study the wealth effect on the class of preference relations exhibit-
ing S-ambiguity aversion. As discussed in the motivating example and as evidenced
by Baillon and Placido (2015), people tend to be less averse to ambiguity when they
become better off overall. To capture this behavioral pattern, we propose an axiom of
decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion. It says that if an (ambiguous) act is preferred
to a constant (unambiguous) act, then this is still the case after a common improvement
on both acts. With the assumption that there is an outcome that both acts yield with the
same probability in all states, the common improvement on acts is formulated as the
improvement on that common outcome. Under some basic axioms, such an improve-
ment on an act amounts to a uniform increase in the utilities that it generates in all
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states. Thus, equivalently the axiom says that if the ambiguity of an act is previously
tolerable, it is even more tolerable after the ensured utility of the act increases.
Our third main result provides three representations for the subclass of ambiguity
averse preference relations exhibiting decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion. The
first two representations are, respectively, a WM representation and a VC represen-
tation, on which the wealth effect has straightforward implications. That is, as the
ensured utility of an act increases, a WM decision maker behaves as if he becomes
less pessimistic and puts a smaller weight on the worst case, and a VC decision maker
behaves as if he is less concerned with prior misspecification and considers a smaller
neighborhood of approximating priors. The third representation is an ambiguity averse
representation introduced by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b). The wealth effect, when
reflected in this representation, amounts to a monotonicity property related to the
ambiguity aversion index in the representation.
Note that the part of our third main result on the WM and VC representations
is not a corollary of our first two main results. Instead of searching for canonical
representations, here we impose a limit condition on each representation. First, we
require that a WM decision maker tends to put the whole weight on the worst case in
an extremely bad situation in which the baseline utility of an act is sufficiently low
and the scale of its ambiguous part is sufficiently large. Second, we require that a
VC decision maker tends to consider only approximating priors in an extremely good
situation in which the baseline utility of an act is sufficiently high and the scale of its
ambiguous part is sufficiently small. It turns out that under the first limit condition,
the admissible set in the WM representation is actually the smallest admissible set.
Similarly, under the second limit condition, the essential set in the VC representation
is the largest essential set. As a result, the two representations that we derive are
canonical representations, although we do not require them to be canonical.
Analogous representations are obtained for the subclass of ambiguity averse pref-
erence relations exhibiting increasing and constant absolute ambiguity aversion. As
a corollary, we get two alternative representations for variational preference relations
studied by Maccheroni et al. (2006), since variational preference relations constitute
the subclass of ambiguity averse preference relations exhibiting constant absolute
ambiguity aversion. Moreover, variational preference relations also exhibit increasing
relative ambiguity aversion that we define in a similar way as decreasing absolute
ambiguity aversion. Increasing relative ambiguity aversion has intuitive implications
on the WM and VC representations of variational preference relations. As the scale of
the ambiguity of an act increases, a WM decision maker behaves as if he is more pes-
simistic and puts more weight on the worst case, and a VC decision maker behaves as if
he is more concerned about prior misspecification and considers a larger neighborhood
of approximating priors.
After discussing the related literature, the rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 introduces the model and axioms. Section 3 introduces two extensions of
the MEU decision rule—the WM rule and the VC rule. Characterizations of classes of
preference relations that admit respective canonical representations are provided. As
an application, we present the two canonical representations of multiplier preference
relations introduced by Hansen and Sargent (2001). Section 4 studies wealth effect
under ambiguity and proposes an axiom of decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion.
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Representations are provided for the subclass of ambiguity averse preference relations
exhibiting decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion. Analogous results are provided for
preference relations exhibiting increasing and constant absolute ambiguity aversion.
Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are given in “Appendix”.
1.1 Related literature
There have been quite a few studies of different versions of the two generalized MEU
decision rules in different settings, e.g., Ghirardato et al. (2004), Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
(2011a), Olszewski (2007), Gajdos et al. (2008), Kopylov (2009), Chateauneuf and
Faro (2009) and Hill (2013). Among them, the most closely related works are Ghi-
rardato et al. (2004) and Hill (2013). Ghirardato et al. (2004) introduce a WM decision
rule and derive a representation with the certainty independence axiom of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) being imposed. The same type of representation is also obtained,
after dropping certainty independence, by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011a). The relation-
ship between their WM representation and ours is elaborated in detail in Sect. 3.
Hill (2013) also axiomatizes a class of preference relations that exhibit changing
ambiguity aversion across acts. In his model, each act is evaluated by the worst expected
utility over a set of priors that depends on the “stakes” involved in choosing the act. This
class of preference relations satisfies the axioms of our Theorem 2, so it constitutes
a subclass of preference relations that admits a canonical VC representation. This
subclass satisfies a stronger independence axiom, a stronger monotonicity axiom and
a stronger ambiguity aversion axiom. These axioms together imply that as the stakes
get bigger, the decision maker evaluates an act by its worst expected utility over a
larger set of priors, as if he becomes less confident.
Regarding the wealth effect under ambiguity, Cherbonniera and Gollier (2015) pro-
pose a definition of decreasing aversion under ambiguity within the smooth ambiguity
model and theα-MEU model. They consider changes in monetary wealth, but their def-
inition does not distinguish the effect on risk aversion and that on ambiguity aversion.
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2017) propose a definition of decreasing absolute ambiguity
aversion in a general setting. They also consider changes in monetary wealth, and
their definition implies that a decision maker who exhibits decreasing absolute ambi-
guity aversion must exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. In contrast to these two
works, we investigate the effect of changes in baseline utilities on ambiguity aversion,
and thus impose no restrictions on a decision maker’s risk attitude. Chambers et al.
(2014) provide a similar definition as ours but theirs is stronger. Our axiom is closer in
spirit to Klibanoff et al. (2005)’s definition, although the authors only define constant
absolute ambiguity aversion. We show that in their model, our axiom is equivalent
to decreasing concavity of a second-order utility index. This is consistent with the
claim of Klibanoff et al. (2005) that a second-order utility index summarizes one’s
ambiguity attitude in the same way as a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function
summarizes one’s risk attitude. Chateauneuf and Faro (2009) assume the existence of
a worst outcome and propose the “worst independence” axiom. This axiom amounts
to our constant relative ambiguity aversion axiom under the assumption of constant
absolute ambiguity aversion, but in general it is weaker.
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2 Themodel
Let S be a finite set of states of the world that contains at least two states, and  the
probability space over S. Let X be a set of outcomes. Following Maccheroni et al.
(2006), we assume that X is a convex subset of some vector space. For example, X is
an interval of monetary payoffs, or the set of all lotteries over a set of prizes as studied
by Anscombe and Aumann (1963). An act is a function f : S → X that yields in
each state an outcome. Let F be the set of all acts. With a slight abuse of notation,
for each x ∈ X , we denote by x the constant act in F that yields x in all states,
and we identify X with the set of all constant acts. For each pair f , g ∈ F and each
α ∈ [0, 1], let α f + (1 − α)g be the mixed act that yields in each s ∈ S the mixed
outcome α f (s) + (1 − α)g(s). Note that mixed outcomes are well defined due to the
convexity of X . A decision maker’s preference relation is a binary relation  on
F . As usual, let  and ∼ denote, respectively, the asymmetric and symmetric parts
of  . Given a decision maker’s preference relation  , for each f ∈ F , a certainty
equivalent of f is a constant act, denoted by x f , between which and the act f the
decision maker is indifferent.
We consider the following basic axioms on a preference relation  .
A.1. Weak order The preference relation  is complete and transitive.
A.2. Risk independence For all x, y, z ∈ X and all α ∈ (0, 1),
x ∼ y ⇒ αx + (1 − α)z ∼ αy + (1 − α)z.
A.3. Continuity For all f , g, h ∈ F , the sets {α ∈ [0, 1] : α f + (1 − α)g  h}
and {α ∈ [0, 1] : h  α f + (1 − α)g} are closed.
A.4. Monotonicity For all f , g ∈ F , if for all s ∈ S, f (s)  g(s), then f  g.
Axiom A.1 says that the preference relation  should be rational. Axiom A.2
imposes von Neumann and Morgenstern’s independence requirement on constant
acts—the acts involving no state ambiguity. Axiom A.3 requires  to be continuous
with respect to mixture coefficients. Axiom A.4 says that an act should be preferred
to another act if it yields a better outcome in each state, where the ranking of out-
comes is assumed to be state independent and induced by the preference relation over
constant acts.
Besides the basic axioms, we are interested in studying preference relations that
exhibit ambiguity aversion. There are two prominent definitions of ambiguity aversion
in the literature. The first is due to Schmeidler (1989), which formulates ambiguity
aversion as convexity of a preference relation. This is based on the understanding that
a mixture of two acts that a decision maker feels indifferent about makes the outcome
in each state less extreme and thus could be viewed as a hedge against ambiguity. So
for an ambiguity averse decision maker, the mixed act, should be preferred to either
of the two indifferent acts. We call this definition S-ambiguity aversion.
A.5.1. S-ambiguity aversion For all f , g ∈ F and all α ∈ (0, 1), if f ∼ g, then
α f + (1 − α)g  f .
An alternative definition of ambiguity aversion is provided by Ghirardato and
Marinacci (2002). The definition is based on a notion of comparative ambiguity aver-
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sion that they propose: A preference relation  1 is said to be more ambiguity
averse than another preference relation  2 if for each f ∈ F and each x ∈ X ,
x  2 f 	⇒ x  1 f .1 Intuitively,  1 is more ambiguity averse than  2 if when-
ever the ambiguity is intolerable according to  2, it is also intolerable according to
 1.
Based on the above notion, if a preference relation  is more ambiguity averse
than a SEU preference relation, then it is said to be ambiguity averse by Ghirardato
and Marinacci (2002). We call this definition GM-ambiguity aversion. Precisely, a
SEU preference relation is a preference relation  such that there is a prior p ∈ 
satisfying that for each pair f , g ∈ F , f  g ⇐⇒ ∑
s∈S
ps f (s) 
∑
s∈S
ps g(s), and in
this case, p is called the subjective prior. Following Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002),
given  , we call the priors in the set
{p ∈  :  ′ is a SEU preference relation with the subjective prior p
and  is more ambiguity averse than  ′}
the benchmark priors, and we call the set the benchmark set. Then GM-ambiguity
aversion amounts to the non-emptiness of the benchmark set.
A.5.2. GM-ambiguity aversion The benchmark set is non-empty.
The two definitions of ambiguity aversion are not logically related in general. But
under the other axioms and a strengthening of A.2, S-ambiguity aversion implies
GM-ambiguity aversion (see Sect. 4).
Lastly, we require that there exist arbitrarily good and arbitrarily bad outcomes.
A.6. Unboundedness There are x, y ∈ X such that x  y, and for each α ∈ (0, 1),
there are z, z′ ∈ X satisfying that αz + (1−α)y  x and y  αz′ + (1−α)x .
Axiom A.6 is stronger than the usual non-degeneracy axiom which requires only
that the decision maker is not indifferent about all outcomes. Axiom A.6 implies that
the utility function representing the preference relation restricted to X is onto (see, e.g.,
Kopylov 2009; Maccheroni et al. 2006). In the literature, A.6 is assumed sometimes to
simplify the analysis and sometimes to guarantee the uniqueness of a representation.2
Throughout this paper, A.6 is imposed to simplify our presentation, and it is also
indispensable for some of our results.3
3 Two generalizedMEU decision rules
Let R be the set of real numbers and R+ the set of nonnegative real numbers.
1 For preference relations satisfying A.1–A.4, the definition adopted here is equivalent to the original
definition in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002).
2 See, e.g., Kopylov (2001), Maccheroni et al. (2006), Strzalecki (2011b), and Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b).
3 Our Theorem 3 relies on how a preference relation ranks the “limiting” acts that yield arbitrarily good or
bad outcomes in all states.
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3.1 Weightedmaxmin rule
For each u : X → R and each f ∈ F , let u( f ) : S → R be the function obtained by
composing u with f . For each ϕ ∈ RS and each p ∈ , let E pϕ denote the expected
value of ϕ with respect to p.
Definition 1 A preference relation  admits a weighted maxmin (WM) representa-
tion if there exist an affine onto function u : X → R, a non-empty, closed, and convex
set D ⊆ , and a function λ : RS → [0, 1] continuous on {ϕ ∈ RS : min
p∈D E pϕ =
max
p∈D E pϕ} such that for each pair f , g ∈ F ,
f  g ⇐⇒ λ(u( f )) min
p∈D E pu( f ) + (1 − λ(u( f ))) maxp∈D E pu( f )
≥ λ(u(g)) min
p∈D E pu(g) + (1 − λ(u(g))) maxp∈D E pu(g). (1)
We denote the representation by 〈u, D, λ〉. We call D an admissible set of priors, or
simply an admissible set, and λ a weight function. We call  a WM preference
relation.
For example, Hurwicz’s α-pessimism decision rule (Hurwicz 1951), also known
as the α-MEU rule, admits a WM representation with the weight function being a
constant equal to α. When α = 1, it reduces to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s MEU
decision rule. MEU preference relations exhibit S-ambiguity aversion (A.5.1). But in
general, α-MEU preference relations do not exhibit S-ambiguity aversion, and thus,
neither do WM preference relations.
One important issue is that the WM representation of a preference relation is
typically not unique, due to the non-uniqueness of admissible sets. In fact, given
a WM representation 〈u, D, λ〉 of  , each closed and convex superset D′ of
D with D′ ⊆  is also an admissible set, since there is a weight function λ′
such that 〈u, D′, λ′〉 is also a WM representation of  . This is because for each
f ∈ F , [min
p∈D E pu( f ), maxp∈D E pu( f )] ⊆ [minp∈D′ E pu( f ), maxp∈D′ u( f )], and thus, there is
λ′ : RS → [0, 1] such that for each f ∈ F ,
λ(u( f )) min
p∈D E pu( f ) + (1 − λ(u( f ))) maxp∈D E pu( f )
= λ′(u( f )) min
p∈D′
E pu( f ) + (1 − λ′(u( f ))) max
p∈D′
E pu( f ).
Example 1 shows that a SEU preference relation admits for each  ∈ [0, 1], a WM rep-
resentation in which the admissible set is the set of -contaminations of the subjective
prior.
Example 1 4Assume X := R for simplicity. Let p∗ ∈ . Consider the following SEU
preference relation  over RS with the subjective prior p∗: For each pair f , g ∈ RS ,
f  g ⇐⇒ E p∗ f ≥ E p∗ g.
4 I thank the referee for suggesting this example.
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For each  ∈ [0, 1], let D := {(1 − )p∗ +  p : p ∈ } denote the set of -
contaminations of the subjective prior p∗. Note that D0 = {p∗}, D1 = , and for
each pair , ′ ∈ [0, 1] with  ≤ ′, D ⊆ D′ . Fix  ∈ [0, 1]. Define λ : RS → R
by setting for each f ∈ RS ,
λ( f ) :=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
max
s∈S f (s) − E p∗ f
max
s∈S f (s) − mins∈S f (s)
if min
s∈S f (s) = maxs∈S f (s),
1 if min
s∈S f (s) = maxs∈S f (s).
Observe that for each f ∈ RS ,λ is continuous at f whenever min
p∈D E p f = maxp∈D E p f .
Moreover, for each f ∈ RS ,
E p∗ f = λ( f ) min
p∈D E p f + (1 − λ
( f )) max
p∈D E p f ,
since min
p∈D E p f = (1 − )E p∗ f +  mins∈S f (s) and maxp∈D E p f = (1 − )E p∗ f +
 max
s∈S f (s). Let u be the identity mapping on R. Then 〈u, D
, λ〉 is a WM represen-
tation of  .
In light of the nesting property of admissible sets, we are interested in finding the
smallest one if it exists. It provides a natural normalization of WM representations. In
particular, given a WM representation 〈u, D, λ〉 of  , the maximum and minimum
expected utilities of each act over D provide, respectively, an upper and lower bounds
of the value of the act, and the bounds are tight if D is the smallest admissible set.
Definition 2 A canonical WM representation of  is a WM representation
〈u, D, λ〉 of  such that D is the smallest admissible set, i.e., for each WM rep-
resentation 〈u′, D′, λ′〉 of  , D ⊆ D′.
Ghirardato et al. (2004) introduce a WM representation different from a canonical
WM representation. Instead of seeking for the smallest admissible set, they require the
admissible set in their representation to satisfy some property related to an “unambigu-
ous” preference relation induced from the initial preference relation. More precisely,
their admissible set is required to be one component of another representation à la
Bewley (2002) of the unambiguous preference relation. We therefore call their repre-
sentation of the initial preference relation a Bewley WM representation. To define
it formally, we recall Ghirardato et al. (2004)’s notion of unambiguous preference
relation (see also Nehring (2007)). Given  , for each pair f , g ∈ F , f is said to be
unambiguously preferred to g, denoted by f  ∗g, if for each α ∈ (0, 1] and each
h ∈ F ,
α f + (1 − α)h  αg + (1 − α)h.
Intuitively, if the consideration of either hedging against or speculating on ambiguity
does not affect the ranking of acts f and g, then it is as if that the decision maker
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unambiguously prefers f to g (see Ghirardato et al. 2004 for a discussion).5 Moreover,
recall that  ∗ admits a Bewley representation if there exist an affine onto function
u : X → R and a non-empty, closed, and convex set D ⊆  such that for each pair
f , g ∈ F ,
f  ∗g ⇐⇒ for each p ∈ D, E pu( f ) ≥ E pu(g). (2)
We denote the Bewley representation by 〈u, D〉. It can be shown that u is unique up
to a positive affine transformation and D is unique.6
Definition 3 A Bewley WM representation of  is a WM representation 〈u, D, λ〉
of  such that 〈u, D〉 is a Bewley representation of the unambiguous preference
relation  ∗ induced from  . We call D the Bewley set of priors, or simply the
Bewley set.
It is known that a preference relation admits a Bewley WM representation as long
as it satisfies some basic axioms.
Proposition 1 A preference relation  satisfies A.1–A.4 and A.6 if and only if it
admits a Bewley weighted maxmin representation 〈u, D, λ〉. Moreover, u is unique
up to a positive affine transformation, D is unique, and given u, λ is unique on
{ϕ ∈ RS : min
p∈D E pϕ = maxp∈D E pϕ}.
7
A version of the “only if” direction of Proposition 1 is shown by Cerreia-Vioglio
et al. (2011a). Ghirardato et al. (2004) also show a version of the “only if” direction but
with the additional certainty independence axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
so that their weight function has more structure.8 Given the existing results, it is not
hard to check the “if” direction.
In general, when a Bewley WM representation exists, a canonical WM representa-
tion may not, and even when both WM representations exist, they could be different
(see Sect. 3.1.1). Our first main result says that if  satisfies S-ambiguity aversion
in addition to A.1–A.4 and A.6, then besides admitting a Bewley WM representa-
tion, it also admits a canonical WM representation. Moreover, the two types of WM
representations coincide.
The converse holds if some additional conditions on the representation are imposed.
For each non-empty, closed, and convex set D ⊆ , let, for each ϕ ∈ RS , l(ϕ; D) :=
max
p∈D E pϕ − minp∈D E pϕ, and let (D) be the set of functions λ : R
S → [0, 1] satisfying
that
(i) (monotonicity) for each pair ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ RS with ϕ′ ≥ ϕ,
max
p∈D E pϕ
′ − max
p∈D E pϕ ≥ λ(ϕ
′)l(ϕ′; D) − λ(ϕ)l(ϕ; D); (3)
5 Equivalently, the unambiguous preference relation  ∗ is the maximal restriction of  that satisfies the
independence axiom (Nehring 2007).
6 For example, see Proposition 5 of Ghirardato et al. (2004).
7 When min
p∈D E pϕ = maxp∈D E pϕ, the choice of λ(ϕ) does not matter.
8 Their weight function is constant additive and positively homogeneous of degree 1.
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(ii) (quasi-concavity) for each pair ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ RS satisfying (3) and for ϕ′′ := ϕ+ϕ′2 ,
max
p∈D E pϕ
′′ − max
p∈D E pϕ ≥ λ(ϕ
′′)l(ϕ′′; D) − λ(ϕ)l(ϕ; D). (4)
Theorem 1 A preference relation  satisfies A.1–A.4, A.5.1, and A.6 if and only
if it admits a canonical weighted maxmin representation 〈u, D, λ〉 with λ ∈ (D).
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation, D is unique and coincides
with the Bewley set, and given u, λ is unique on {ϕ ∈ RS : min
p∈D E pϕ = maxp∈D E pϕ}.
A well-known representation of the class of preference relations satisfying A.1–
A.4, A.5.1, and A.6, different from ours, is provided by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b).
To define it formally, let G be the set of functions G : R× → (−∞,∞] such that (i)
G is quasi-convex and lower semicontinuous on R × , (ii) for each p ∈ , G(·, p)
is non-decreasing on R, and (iii) for each t ∈ R, min
p∈ G(t, p) = t . A function G ∈ G
is said to be linearly continuous if the functional I : RS → R, defined by setting for
each ϕ ∈ RS , I (ϕ) := min
p∈ G(E pϕ, p), is continuous.
Definition 4 A preference relation  admits an ambiguity averse representation
if there exist an affine onto function u : X → R and a linearly continuous function
G ∈ G such that for each pair f , g ∈ F ,
f  g ⇐⇒ min
p∈ G(E pu( f ), p) ≥ minp∈ G(E pu(g), p)
We denote the representation by 〈u, G〉.
It is shown by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b) that a preference relation satisfies A.1–
A.4, A.5.1, and A.6 if and only if it admits an ambiguity averse representation 〈u, G〉,
where u is unique up to a positive affine transformation, and given u, G is unique.9
Given a preference relation  that admits an ambiguity averse representation 〈u, G〉,
they define the set10
D∗ := cl({p ∈  : for some t ∈ R, G(t, p) < ∞}), (5)
and show that 〈u, D∗〉 is a Bewley representation of the unambiguous preference
relation  ∗ induced from  .11
Our result above, in view of theirs, not only provides an alternative representa-
tion of such a preference relation, but also shows that the set D∗ derived from their
representation is the smallest admissible set.
9 See Theorems 3 and 5 and Proposition 4 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b).
10 The set D∗ is independent of the choice of ambiguity averse representations. Indeed, by Proposition 4
of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b), if 〈u′, G′〉 is another ambiguity averse representation of  , then for each
p ∈ , G(t, p) < ∞ for some t ∈ R if and only if G′(t ′, p) < ∞ for some t ′ ∈ R.
11 See Proposition 9 and Theorem 10 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b).
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Corollary 1 If a preference relation admits an ambiguity averse representation 〈u, G〉,
then it also admits a canonical weighted maxmin representation 〈u, D∗, λ〉 with λ ∈
(D∗).
3.1.1 Relation between a canonical WM representation and a Bewley WM
representation
Restricted to preference relations satisfying S-ambiguity aversion, we have shown that
a canonical WM representation is the same as a Bewley WM representation. But this is
not the case for preference relations that do not satisfy S-ambiguity aversion. We now
provide two examples, respectively, showing that (1) a preference relation admitting
a Bewley WM representation may not admit a canonical WM representation, and (2)
even if a preference relation admits both types of representations, the Bewley set may
not be the smallest admissible set. The proofs of our claims in the two examples are
given in “Appendix.”
Example 2 (The Bewley set exists, but the smallest admissible set does not) Let
S := {1, 2, 3} and X := R for simplicity. Let p′ := ( 23 , 112 , 14 ), q ′ := ( 112 , 23 , 14 ),
and p∗ := ( 13 , 13 , 13 ) be probabilities over S, where the sth coordinate denotes the
probability of state s, s ∈ S. Let D1 := {p′, q ′} and D2 := {p ∈  : d(p, p∗) ≤ 1√6 }.
Define V : RS → R by setting for each f ∈ RS ,
V ( f ) :=
⎧
⎨
⎩
min
p∈D1
E p f if max{ f (1), f (2)} < f (3),
min
p∈D2
E p f if max{ f (1), f (2)} ≥ f (3).
Define  over RS by setting for each pair f , g ∈ RS , f  g ⇐⇒ V ( f ) ≥ V (g).
The preference relation  satisfies A.1–A.4 and A.6. By Proposition 1,  admits a
Bewley WM representation.12 But  does not admit a canonical WM representation.
Example 3 (The Bewley set is not the smallest admissible set) Let S, X , p′, q ′, p∗,
and D2 be defined as in Example 2. Let p′′ := ( 23 , 16 , 16 ) and q ′′ := ( 16 , 23 , 16 ) be
probabilities over S. For each f ∈ RS with max{ f (1), f (2)} < f (3), let
α( f ) :=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
med
{
0,
1 − E p′′ f
1 − E p′′ f + E p′ f , 1
}
if f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3),
med
{
0,
1 − Eq ′′ f
1 − Eq ′′ f + Eq ′ f , 1
}
if f (2) < f (1) < f (3),
and
D1( f ) := {α( f )p′ + (1 − α( f ))p′′, α( f )q ′ + (1 − α( f ))q ′′},
12 It can be shown that the Bewley set is cl(co(D1 ∪ {p ∈ D2|p3 ≥ 16 })).
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where med is the median operator.13 Define V : RS → R by setting for each f ∈ RS ,
V ( f ) :=
⎧
⎨
⎩
min
p∈D1( f )
E p f if max{ f (1), f (2)} < f (3),
min
p∈D2
E p f if max{ f (1), f (2)} ≥ f (3).
Define  over RS by setting for each pair f , g ∈ RS , f  g ⇐⇒ V ( f ) ≥ V (g).
Like Example 2,  satisfies A.1–A.4 and A.6 and thus admits a Bewley WM
representation.14 Moreover,  admits a canonical WM representation in which the
smallest admissible set is {p ∈ D2 : p3 ≥ 16 }. But this set is not the Bewley set.
3.2 Variant constraint rule
For each pair p, q ∈ , let d(p, q) denote the Euclidean distance between p and q.
For each p ∈ D and each closed subset of A of , define the distance between p and
A, denoted by d(p, A), to be min
q∈A d(p, q). Given  , for each f ∈ F , let x∗ f ∈ X
denote the worst outcome yielded by f , i.e., x∗ f = f (s) for some s ∈ S such that for
each s′ ∈ S, f (s′)  x∗ f .
Definition 5 A preference relation  admits a variant constraint (VC) represen-
tation if there exist an affine onto function u : X → R, a non-empty, closed, and
convex set K ⊆ , and a function σ : RS → R+ continuous on {u( f ) ∈ RS : f ∈
F , f  x∗ f } and lower semicontinuous on {u( f ) ∈ RS : f ∈ F , f ∼ x∗ f } such that
for each pair f , g ∈ F ,
f  g ⇐⇒ min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(u( f )) E pu( f ) ≥ minp∈:d(p,K )≤σ(u(g)) E pu(g).
We denote the representation by 〈u, K , σ 〉. We call K an essential set of priors, or
simply an essential set, and σ a constraint function. We call  a VC preference
relation.
A MEU preference relation admits a VC representation in which σ is a constant
equal to 0. While MEU preference relations exhibit S-ambiguity aversion, this is not
true for VC preference relations in general. Instead, VC preference relations satisfy
GM-ambiguity aversion. Moreover, we will show that VC preference relations are
characterized by GM-ambiguity aversion together with some basic axioms.
Like a WM representation, a VC representation of a preference relation is typically
not unique, due to the non-uniqueness of essential sets. In fact, given a VC repre-
sentation 〈u, K , σ 〉 of  , each non-empty, closed, and convex subset K ′ of K is an
essential set, since there is a constraint function σ ′ such that 〈u, K ′, σ ′〉 is also a VC
representation of  . Example 4 illustrates this fact using a MEU preference relation.
13 For each t ∈ R, med{0, t, 1} is the median of 0, t, 1.
14 It can be shown that the Bewley set is the same as in Example 2.
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Example 4 Let S, X , p∗, D2 be defined as in Example 2. Consider the MEU preference
relation  over RS defined by setting for each pair f , g ∈ RS , f  g ⇐⇒
min
p∈D2
E p f ≥ min
p∈D2
E pg.
For each  ∈ [0, 1√6 ], let K  := {p ∈  : d(p, p∗) ≤ }. Note that K 0 = {p∗},
K
1√
6 = D2, and for each pair , ′ ∈ [0, 1√6 ] with  ≤ ′, K  ⊆ K 
′
. Fix  ∈ [0, 1√6 ].
Define σ : RS → R+ by setting for each f ∈ RS , σ ( f ) := 1√6 − . Observe that
σ is continuous, and that for each f ∈ RS ,
min
p∈D2
E p f = min
p∈:d(p,K  )≤σ( f ) E p f ,
since D2 = {p ∈  : d(p, K ) ≤ σ ( f )}. Let u be the identity mapping on R. Then
〈u, K , σ 〉 is a VC representation of  .
In light of the nesting property of essential sets, we can define a canonical VC
representation in a similar way as defining a canonical WM representation.
Definition 6 A canonical VC representation of  is a VC representation 〈u, K , σ 〉
of  such that K is the largest essential set, i.e., for each VC representation 〈u′, K ′, σ ′〉
of  , K ′ ⊆ K .
Our second main result says that if  satisfies GM-ambiguity aversion in addition
to A.1–A.4 and A.6, then it admits a canonical VC representation. Moreover, the
largest essential set is the set of benchmark priors.
The converse holds with an additional condition imposed on the VC representation.
For each non-empty, closed, and convex set K ⊆ , let 	(K ) denote the set of
functions σ : RS → R+ such that for each pair ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ RS with ϕ′ ≥ ϕ,
min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(ϕ′)
E pϕ′ ≥ min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(ϕ) E pϕ. (6)
Theorem 2 A preference relation satisfies A.1–A.4, A.5.2, and A.6 if and only if it
admits a canonical variant constraint representation 〈u, K , σ 〉 with σ ∈ 	(K ). More-
over, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation, K is unique and coincides with
the benchmark set, and given u, σ is unique on {u( f ) ∈ RS : f ∈ F , f  x∗ f }.15
While Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b) provide the characterization of preference
relations exhibiting S-ambiguity aversion, Theorem 2 provides the characterization of
preference relations exhibiting GM-ambiguity aversion.
The class of preference relations admitting canonical VC representations is different
from the class admitting canonical WM representations. In view of Theorems 1 and 2,
there are preference relations admitting canonical WM representations but not canon-
ical VC representations, since S-ambiguity aversion does not imply GM-ambiguity
15 If x∗ f ∼ f , then min
s∈S u( f (s)) = u(x f ). Thus as long as σ(u( f )) is sufficiently large,
min
p∈D:d(p,K )≤σ(u( f )) E pu( f ) = u(x f ).
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aversion. On the other hand, there are preference relations admitting canonical VC
representations but not canonical WM representations, as shown in Example 5.
Example 5 Let  be defined as in Example 2. As discussed in Example 2,  satisfies
A.1–A.4 and A.6, and  does not admit a canonical WM representation. Since for
each f ∈ RS , E p∗ f ≥ V ( f ), it can be readily seen that p∗ is a benchmark prior. Then
 satisfies A.5.2, and thus, by Theorem 2,  admits a canonical VC representation.16
When  admits both a canonical WM representation and a canonical VC repre-
sentation, the largest essential set is always a subset of the smallest admissible set, and
the two sets coincide if and only if  is a MEU preference relation.
Proposition 2 If a preference relation admits both a canonical weighted maxmin rep-
resentation 〈u, D, λ〉 and a canonical variant constraint representation 〈u′, K , σ 〉,
then K ⊆ D.
Proposition 3 A preference relation is a MEU preference relation if and only if it
admits both a canonical weighted maxmin representation 〈u, D, λ〉 and a canonical
variant constraint representation 〈u′, K , σ 〉 with K = D, λ being a constant function
equal to 1, and σ being a constant function equal to 0.
Assume that  satisfies A.1–A.4, A.5.1, and A.6. Recall that by Cerreia-Vioglio
et al. (2011b),  admits an ambiguity averse representation 〈u, G〉. We have shown
in Sect. 3.1 that  also admits a canonical WM representation in which D∗ defined
by (5) is the smallest admissible set. A similar result can be obtained here. Formally,
let
K ∗ := {p ∈  : for each t ∈ R, G(t, p) = t}. (7)
Like D∗, the set K ∗ is independent of the choice of ambiguity averse representations
of  . It can be readily shown that K ∗ is the benchmark set. Thus,  satisfies
GM-ambiguity aversion if and only if K ∗ is non-empty. When K ∗ is non-empty,
by Theorem 2,  admits a canonical VC representation in which K ∗ is the largest
essential set.
Corollary 2 If a preference relation admits an ambiguity averse representation 〈u, G〉
and K ∗ = ∅, then it also admits a canonical variant constraint representation
〈u, K ∗, σ 〉 with σ ∈ 	(K ∗).
3.3 Different representations of themultiplier decision rule
There is a large class of preference relations exhibiting both S-ambiguity aversion and
GM-ambiguity aversion as well as satisfying A.1–A.4 and A.6. Thus, besides admitting
an ambiguity aversion representation studied by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b), this
class of preference relations also admits a canonical WM representation and a canon-
ical VC representation. Although the three representations have different behavioral
interpretations, they are observationally equivalent.
16 It can be shown that the largest essential set is {p ∈ D2 : p3 ≥ 14 }.
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On the other hand, different representations of a decision rule facilitate our under-
standing of the rule. As an example, we consider two important robust decision rules
introduced by Hansen and Sargent (2001): the constraint rule and the multiplier rule.17
While the multiplier rule is originally defined in terms of an ambiguity averse rep-
resentation, we will provide two alternative representations. We will argue that each
of them provides a different way of understanding the connection between the two
decision rules.
For each pair p, q ∈ , we write p  q if p is absolutely continuous with respect
to q, and we denote the relative entropy of p with respect to q by R(p||q), i.e.,
R(p||q) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∑
s∈S
ps log
ps
qs
if p  q,
∞ otherwise.
The relative entropy, known as Kullback–Leibler divergence, is a measure of “dis-
tance” between two probabilities.
Definition 7 A preference relation  admits a constraint representation if there
exist an affine onto function u : X → R, a prior q ∈ , and a constant η ∈ R+ such
that for each pair f , g ∈ F ,
f  g ⇐⇒ min
p∈:R(p||q)≤η E pu( f ) ≥ minp∈:R(p||q)≤η E pu(g). (8)
We denote the representation by 〈u, q, η〉. We call  a constraint preference rela-
tion.
A constraint representation 〈u, q, η〉 is a special WM representation 〈u, D, λ〉 in
which D = {p ∈  : R(p||q) ≤ η} and λ is a constant function equal to 1. In spirit,
it can also be viewed as a special VC representation with a singleton essential set, an
alternative measure of “distance” between two probabilities, and a constant constraint
function.
Definition 8 A preference relation  admits a multiplier representation if there
exist an affine onto function u : X → R, a prior q ∈ , and a constant θ ∈ (0,∞]
such that for each pair f , g ∈ F ,
f  g ⇐⇒ min
p∈[E pu( f ) + θ R(p||q)] ≥ minp∈[E pu(g) + θ R(p||q)]. (9)
We denote the representation by 〈u, q, θ〉. We call  a multiplier preference rela-
tion.18
17 Strzalecki (2011a) axiomatizes the multiplier rule.
18 The preference relation in Definition 8 is called a multiplier preference relation since the parameter θ in
the unconstrained minimization problem in (9) can be viewed as a Lagrange multiplier in the Lagrangian
of the constrained minimization problem in (8).
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A multiplier representation 〈u, q, θ〉 is an ambiguity averse representation 〈u, G〉
in which G : R ×  → (−∞,∞] is given by, for each (t, p) ∈ R × , G(t, p) =
t +θ R(p||q). A multiplier preference relation exhibits both S-ambiguity aversion and
GM-ambiguity aversion and satisfies A.1–A.4 and A.6. By Theorems 1 and 2, it admits
both a canonical WM representation and a canonical VC representation. Moreover,
we can explicitly pin down the components of each representation.
Proposition 4 Assume that a preference relation admits a multiplier representation
〈u, q, θ〉. Then it admits a canonical weighted maxmin representation 〈u, D, λ〉. When
θ < ∞, D = {p ∈  : p  q}, and for each ϕ ∈ RS,
λ(ϕ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max
s∈S:qs>0
ϕ(s) + θ log Eqe− ϕθ
max
s∈S:qs>0
ϕ(s) − min
s∈S:qs>0
ϕ(s)
if min
s∈S:qs>0
ϕ(s) < max
s∈S:qs>0
ϕ(s),
1 if min
s∈S:qs>0
ϕ(s) = max
s∈S:qs>0
ϕ(s),
(10)
and when θ = ∞, D = {q}, and λ is a constant function equal to 1. It also admits a
canonical variant constraint representation 〈u, K , σ 〉. When θ < ∞, K = {q}, and
for each ϕ ∈ RS,
σ(ϕ) = min
p∈:E pϕ=−θ log Eq e−
ϕ
θ
d(p, q), (11)
and when θ = ∞, K = {q}, and σ is a constant function equal to 0.
A connection between the multiplier rule and the constraint rule is established by
Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008) in a dynamic resource allocation problem. Fixing
u : X → R and q ∈ , they show, under some conditions, that for each η, there
is θ such that the constraint rule 〈u, q, η〉 and the multiplier rule 〈u, q, θ〉 generate
the same optimal allocation, and vise versa. But in general, as they point out, the two
decision rules induce totally different preference relations.
A further understanding of their connection can be obtained in view of each of our
alternative representations. First, both constraint and multiplier preference relations
are WM preference relations, and the smallest admissible sets and weight functions
are different. The smallest admissible set of a constraint preference relation is a neigh-
borhood of a central prior with the “distance” measure being the relative entropy and
the radius a constant. In contrast, the smallest admissible set of a multiplier preference
relation is either the set of all priors absolutely continuous with respect to a central
prior or the set containing only the central prior. More importantly, a constraint prefer-
ence relation always evaluates an act by its worst possible expected utility. In contrast,
a multiplier preference relation evaluates an act by a weighted average of its best and
worst possible expected utilities, and the weights vary across acts.
Second, both constraint and multiplier preference relations are VC preference rela-
tions, and the largest essential sets and constraint functions are different. While the
largest essential set of a constraint preference relation is a neighborhood of a cen-
tral prior, that of a multiplier preference relation is the set containing only a central
123
Preferences with changing ambiguity aversion
prior. More importantly, although both preference relations evaluate an act by its worst
possible expected utility, the set of possible priors stays constant for a constraint pref-
erence relation while it changes across acts for a multiplier preference relation. This
can be seen more transparently when we replace the Euclidean distance measure with
relative entropy in the VC representation of the multiplier rule. Indeed, if  admits
a multiplier representation 〈u, q, θ〉 with θ < ∞, then for each pair f , g ∈ F ,
f  g ⇐⇒ min
p∈:R(p||q)≤σ ′(u( f ))
E pu( f ) ≥ min
p∈:R(p||q)≤σ ′(u(g))
E pu(g) (12)
where σ ′ : RS → R is given by, for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
σ ′(ϕ) = min
p∈:E pϕ=−θ log Eq e−
ϕ
θ
R(p||q).
Comparing (8) and (12), we can see that a constraint preference relation always regards
the priors in a fixed neighborhood of q possible, whereas a multiplier preference
relation considers neighborhoods of different sizes for different acts.
Note that the key implication of using relative entropy instead of the Euclidean
distance in a VC representation is that it excludes the priors that are not absolutely
continuous with respect to a central prior. Indeed, only when p  q, R(p||q) < ∞.
But this is not an issue for a multiplier preference relation, since by definition (9), it
disregards all the priors that are not absolutely continuous with respect to the central
prior q. Thus, relative entropy can be used instead of the Euclidean distance in the VC
representation of a multiplier preference, as long as the constraint function is adjusted
correspondingly.
4 Changing ambiguity aversion
Within the class of preference relations exhibiting S-ambiguity aversion and GM-
ambiguity aversion and satisfying A.1–A.4 and A.6, our goal, in this section, is to study
those exhibiting particular patterns of changing ambiguity aversion with respect to
changes in wealth. We provide a definition of decreasing/increasing absolute ambiguity
aversion and investigate its implication on the representations studied in Sect. 3.
4.1 Wealth effect and decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion
To motivate the study of the wealth effect, consider the following variation of Ellsberg
(1961)’s thought experiment.
Example 6 An urn contains 100 balls, of which 33 are red, and 67 are either black or
white. A ball is drawn from the urn. For each t ∈ R+, rt denotes the act “betting on
red.” It pays 100 + t dollars if the ball is red and t dollars otherwise. Let bt denote
the act “betting on black,” and its payoff is similarly given. See the payoff Tables 1, 2
and 3.
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Table 1 Payoffs of rt and bt t ∈ R+ Red Black White
rt 100 + t t t
bt t 100 + t t
Table 2 Payoffs of r0 and b0 t = 0 Red Black White
r0 100 0 0
b0 0 100 0
Table 3 Payoffs of r104 and
b104
t = 104 Red Black White
r104 10,100 10,000 10,000
b104 10,000 10,100 10,000
Assume that a decision maker’s preference relation  satisfies Axioms A.1–A.4,
A.5.1, and A.6, and assume for simplicity that he is risk neutral. For each t ∈ R+, rt is
an unambiguous act which yields 100 + t with probability 0.33 and t with probability
0.67, whereas bt is an ambiguous act which yields 100 + t and t with unknown
probabilities. The decision maker may prefer r0 to b0 if he is averse to ambiguity,
while the degree of his ambiguity aversion may decrease with the increase in the
baseline prize t . It can be expected that when t is sufficiently large, he is willing to
take the ambiguity bearing act, and prefers say b104 to r104 .
Such a behavioral pattern is evidenced by the laboratory experiments of Baillon and
Placido (2015) with subjects that may or may not be risk neutral. In the following, we
propose a set of behavioral axioms to capture this and other analogous phenomena. The
experiments designed by Baillon and Placido (2015) basically test the implications of
our axioms.
A.2.1. Decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion.19 For all f ∈ F , x, y, z ∈ X and
α ∈ (0, 1), if either f is a constant act or y  x , then
α f + (1 − α)x  αz + (1 − α)x
⇒ α f + (1 − α)y  αz + (1 − α)y. (13)
When f is constant, (13) is essentially von Neumann–Morgenstern’s independence
requirement on constant acts. When f is not constant, then (13) says that if an (ambigu-
ous) act α f + (1 − α)x is preferred to a constant act αz + (1 − α)x , then it is still the
case after improving the certainty part from x to y for both acts. In other words, if the
19 After completing this paper, I learned that Ghirardato and Siniscalchi independently propose a very
similar axiom of decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion in their work “Symmetric preferences,” presented
in RUD 2015 and D-TEA 2015.
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ambiguity is previously tolerable, it is even more tolerable after a common improve-
ment on the certainty part. Axiom A.2.1 implies that if an act induces a larger utility
than another act by an ensured amount t in each state, then the value of the former act
is larger than the later by at least t .
Similarly, if we replace y  x in A.2.1 by x  y, then  exhibits increasing
absolute ambiguity aversion.
A.2.2. Increasing absolute ambiguity aversion For all f ∈ F , x, y, z ∈ X and
α ∈ (0, 1), if either f is a constant act or x  y, then
α f + (1 − α)x  αz + (1 − α)x
⇒ α f + (1 − α)y  αz + (1 − α)y.
If we require both A.2.1 and A.2.2 to hold, then  exhibits constant absolute ambi-
guity aversion defined by Grant and Polak (2013).
A.2.3. Constant absolute ambiguity aversion (Grant and Polak 2013) For all f ∈
F , x, y, z ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1),
α f + (1 − α)x  αz + (1 − α)x
⇒ α f + (1 − α)y  αz + (1 − α)y. (14)
While the above axioms deal with the effect of an absolute change in the certainty
part of an act, one can imagine a similar effect of a relative change in the proportion of
the certainty part of an act. We refer the readers to Maccheroni et al. (2006) for such a
thought experiment. To capture the increase in ambiguity aversion in the relative size
of ambiguity, we propose the following axiom as analogous to A.2.2.
A.2.4. Increasing relative ambiguity aversion For all f ∈ F , x, z ∈ X and
α, β ∈ (0, 1), if α ≥ β, then
α f + (1 − α)x  αz + (1 − α)x
⇒ β f + (1 − β)x  βz + (1 − β)x . (15)
Axiom A.2.4 says that if α f + (1−α)x is preferred to a constant act αz + (1−α)x ,
then this is still the case after the proportion of the certainty part increases in both
acts. In other words, the degree of ambiguity aversion increases as the proportion
of the ambiguous part of an act increases. Similarly, a preference relation exhibits
decreasing relative ambiguity aversion if (15) holds for each pair α, β ∈ (0, 1) such
that α ≤ β, and constant relative ambiguity aversion if (15) holds for each pair
α, β ∈ (0, 1). Chateauneuf and Faro (2009) propose a so-called worst independence
axiom under the assumption that there is a worst outcome in X . Their axiom amounts to
our constant relative ambiguity aversion for the class of preference relations satisfying
A.1, A.3, A.4, A.5.1, and exhibiting constant absolute ambiguity aversion. In general,
for preference relations satisfying A.1–A.4, their axiom is implied by ours.
It is known that under A.1 and A.3–A.6, preference relations exhibiting constant
absolute ambiguity aversion also exhibit increasing relative ambiguity aversion. We
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will show that decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion also implies increasing relative
ambiguity aversion in some limit form.
4.2 Characterizations
For each t ∈ R, we denote by t1 a constant element in RS with each coordinate being
t , and when t = 1, we simply write 1. For each non-empty, closed, and convex set
K ⊆ , let 	¯(K ) be the set of functions σ ∈ 	(K ) such that for each pair ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ RS
satisfying (6) and for ϕ′′ := ϕ+ϕ′2 ,
min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(ϕ′′)
E pϕ′′ ≥ min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(ϕ) E pϕ.
That is, the constraint functions in 	¯(K ) satisfy not only the monotonicity requirement
imposed on the functions in 	(K ), but also a quasi-concavity requirement.
Theorem 3 Let a preference relation  be given. The following statements are equiv-
alent.
1. The preference relation  satisfies A.1, A.2.1, A.3, A.4, A.5.1, and A.6.
2. The preference relation  admits a weighted maxmin representation 〈u, D, λ〉
such that λ ∈ (D), and for each ϕ ∈ RS, λ(ϕ + t1) is non-increasing in t and
limk→∞ limt→∞ λ(kϕ − t1) = 1.
3. The preference relation  admits a variant constraint representation 〈u, K , σ 〉
such that σ ∈ 	¯(K ), and for each ϕ ∈ RS, σ(ϕ + t1) is non-increasing in t and
limk↘0 limt→∞ σ(kϕ + t1) = 0.
4. The preference relation  admits an ambiguity averse representation 〈u, G〉 such
that for each p ∈ , G(t, p) − t is non-decreasing in t.
Moreover, 〈u, D, λ〉 is a canonical weighted maxmin representation, 〈u, K , σ 〉 is a
canonical variant constraint representation, and for each ϕ ∈ RS, limt→∞ λ(kϕ− t1)
and limt→∞ σ(kϕ + t1) is non-decreasing in k on (0,∞).
Decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion has straightforward behavioral implica-
tions on the WM representation and the VC representation of a preference relation. As
the baseline utility of an act increases, it is as if that a WM decision maker puts less
weight on the worst case, and a VC decision maker considers a smaller neighborhood
of approximating priors.
Note that under A.1, A.2.1, A.3, and A.4, S-ambiguity aversion (A.5.1) implies GM-
ambiguity aversion (A.5.2). Thus, by Theorems 1 and 2, the preference relation admits
both a canonical WM representation and a canonical VC representation. However, the
equivalence of statements 1, 2, and 3 is not a corollary of Theorems 1 and 2. In
Theorem 3, we do not require the admissible set in the WM representation to be the
smallest. Neither do we require the essential set in the VC representation to be the
largest. Instead, we impose a limit condition on each of the representations, which
turns out to determine the representation uniquely. In fact, the two limit conditions are
characterizing conditions of the smallest admissible set and the largest essential set,
respectively. Hence, both representations are canonical.
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The two limit conditions have natural interpretations. The condition
limk→∞ limt→∞ λ(kϕ − t1) = 1 says that a WM decision maker tends to consider
only the worst case in an extremely bad situation where the baseline utility of an act is
sufficiently low and the scale of its ambiguous part is sufficiently large. The condition
limk↘0 limt→∞ σ(kϕ + t1) = 0 says that a VC decision maker tends to consider only
approximating priors in the essential set K in an extremely good situation where the
baseline utility of an act is sufficiently high and the scale of its ambiguous part is
sufficiently small.
Theorem 3 also shows that decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion implies increas-
ing relative ambiguity aversion in some limit form under the other axioms. The fact
that limt→∞ λ(kϕ − t1) is non-decreasing in k on (0,∞) implies that when the base-
line utility of an act is sufficiently low, if the scale of its ambiguous part increases, then
a WM decision maker behaves as if he is more pessimistic and puts a larger weight on
the worst case. Similarly, limt→∞ σ(kϕ + t1) being non-decreasing in k on (0,∞)
implies that when the baseline utility of an act is sufficiently high, if the scale of its
ambiguous part increases, then a VC decision maker behaves as if he is more cautious
and considers a larger neighborhood of approximating priors.
Analogous representations can be obtained for preference relations exhibiting
increasing absolute ambiguity aversion: Theorem 3 holds if A.2.1 is replaced by A.2.2
and t by −t . Since A.2.3 is equivalent to the combination of A.2.1 and A.2.2, we
further obtain the representations for preference relations exhibiting constant absolute
ambiguity aversion.
Corollary 3 Let a preference relation  be given. The following statements are equiv-
alent.
1. The preference relation  satisfies A.1, A.2.3, A.3, A.4, A.5.1, and A.6.
2. The preference relation  admits a weighted maxmin representation 〈u, D, λ〉
such that λ ∈ (D), and for each ϕ ∈ RS, λ(ϕ + t1) is constant in t and
limk→∞ λ(kϕ) = 1.
3. The preference relation  admits a variant constraint representation 〈u, K , σ 〉
such that σ ∈ 	¯(K ), and for each ϕ ∈ RS, σ(ϕ + t1) is constant in t and
limk↘0 σ(kϕ) = 0.
4. The preference relation  admits an ambiguity averse representation 〈u, G〉 such
that for each p ∈ , G(t, p) − t is constant in t .
Moreover, 〈u, D, λ〉 is a canonical weighted maxmin representation; 〈u, K , σ 〉 is a
canonical variant constraint representation, and for each ϕ ∈ RS, λ(kϕ) and σ(kϕ)
is non-decreasing in k on (0,∞).
As shown in Corollary 3, constant absolute ambiguity aversion implies that no
matter how the baseline utility of an act changes, a WM decision maker puts the same
weight on the worst case, and a VC decision maker considers the same neighborhood
of approximating priors.
It is known that constant absolute ambiguity aversion implies increasing relative
ambiguity aversion under the other axioms in Corollary 3. We show that when the scale
of an (ambiguous) act increases, it is as if that a WM decision maker puts a larger
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weight on the worst case, or that a VC decision maker considers a larger neighborhood
of approximating priors.
The equivalence of statements 1 and 4 in Corollary 3 reproduces some existing
results in the literature. Maccheroni et al. (2006) propose a weak certainty indepen-
dence axiom and call a preference relation a variational preference relation if it
satisfies A.1, A.3–A.6, and weak certainty independence. They show that a preference
relation is a variational preference relation if and only if there exist an affine onto
function u : X → R and a lower semicontinuous convex function c :  → [0,∞]
with min
p∈ c(p) = 0 such that
f  g ⇐⇒ min
p∈[E pu( f ) + c(p)] ≥ minp∈[E pu(g) + c(p)]. (16)
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b) show that this representation amounts to an ambiguity
averse representation 〈u, G〉 in which G is additively separable.20 Since weak certainty
independence is known to be equivalent to constant absolute ambiguity aversion under
the other axioms,21 our result can be expected since G is additively separable if for
each p ∈ , G(t, p) − t is constant in t .
We close this subsection by providing a differential characterization of the smallest
admissible set for preference relations exhibiting decreasing absolute ambiguity aver-
sion. Let a preference relation  be given. Following Rigotti and Strazalecki (2008),
define the correspondence π : F ⇒  by setting for each f ∈ F ,
π( f ) :=
{
p ∈  :
∑
s∈S
ps f (s) 
∑
s∈S
ps g(s) 	⇒ f  g
}
. (17)
The interpretation is that the set π( f ) consists of all the prior beliefs that rationalize
the choice of f over other acts (see Cerreia-Vioglio et al. 2011b). These beliefs are
useful in the study of ambiguity averse preference relations and their applications (see,
e.g., Rigotti and Strazalecki 2008; Lang 2017). Mathematically, they correspond to
the supporting hyperplanes of the upper contour set of f .
For a general preference relation satisfying A.1–A.4, A.5.1, and A.6, Cerreia-
Vioglio et al. (2011b) show that D∗ = cl(co( ⋃
f ∈F
π( f ))). Thus, by our Corollary 1,
cl(co(
⋃
f ∈F
π( f ))) is the smallest admissible set. Proposition 5 strengthens this result
for preference relations exhibiting decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion.
Proposition 5 Assume that a preference relation  satisfies A.1, A.2.1, A.3, A.4,
A.5.1, and A.6. Let 〈u, D, λ〉 be a canonical weighted maxmin representation of  .
Then for each x ∈ X, D = cl(co( ⋃
f ∼x
π( f ))).
Proposition 5 implies that to identify the smallest admissible set, it suffices to find
the set of beliefs that rationalize the decision maker’s choices of the acts that lie on
one indifference curve.
20 The function G : R× → (−∞,∞] is additively separable if there are γ : R → R and c :  → [0,∞]
such that for each (t, p) ∈ R × , G(t, p) = γ (t) + c(p). See their Proposition 12.
21 Grant and Polak (2013) show the equivalence under A.1, A.3, and weaker versions of A.4 and A.6.
123
Preferences with changing ambiguity aversion
Note that a differential characterization of the largest essential set can be obtained
by restricting π to constant acts. For each x ∈ X , the set π(x) is interpreted as the
set of beliefs that rationalize the choice of the constant act x over ambiguous acts. It
is known that the benchmark set coincides with
⋂
x∈X
π(x) (see, e.g., Cerreia-Vioglio
et al. 2011a). Thus, by Theorem 2, for each preference relation that admits a canonical
VC representation, the largest essential set is
⋂
x∈X
π(x).
Lang (2017) assumes that X is a set of simple lotteries over R and proposes defini-
tions, for an ambiguity averse preference relation, to distinguish between first-order
and second-order ambiguity aversion at a wealth level w ∈ R. Lang (2017) character-
izes second-order ambiguity aversion at w by π(w) being a singleton. In view of Lang
(2017)’s result, for an ambiguity averse preference relation that exhibits second-order
ambiguity aversion at each w ∈ R, it admits a canonical VC representation only if
there is p ∈  such that for each w ∈ R, π(w) = {p}. In this case, the largest essential
set is exactly the singleton {p}.
4.3 Comparison with other definitions
Based on a notion of comparative “dispersion,” Chambers et al. (2014) also propose
the definitions of decreasing, increasing, and constant absolute ambiguity aversion.
According to them, an act f is considered at least as dispersed as an act g, denoted
by f  g, if there exist x ∈ X and λ ∈ [0, 1] such that g = λ f + (1 − λ)x . They
say that a preference relation  exhibits decreasing (increasing) absolute ambiguity
aversion if for each pair f , g ∈ F with f  g, each pair x, y ∈ X with y  x (x  y),
and each α ∈ (0, 1),
α f + (1 − α)x  αg + (1 − α)x
⇒ α f + (1 − α)y  αg + (1 − α)y. (18)
They say that  exhibits constant absolute ambiguity aversion if it exhibits both their
decreasing and increasing absolute ambiguity aversion.
Since for each f ∈ F and each z ∈ X , f  z, their decreasing absolute ambiguity
aversion is stronger than ours. If we apply their definition, then we get a similar result as
Theorem 3 with modified monotonicity conditions of λ, σ and G.22 This is also the case
for increasing absolute ambiguity aversion. As for constant absolute ambiguity aver-
sion, it turns out that their seemingly stronger definition is in fact equivalent to A.2.3.
Proposition 6 Assume that a preference relation  satisfies A.1–A.4 and A.6. Then
for each pair f , g ∈ F with f  g, each pair x, y ∈ X, and each α ∈ (0, 1), (18)
holds if and only if  satisfies A.2.3.
22 If  satisfies A.1–A.4 and A.6, then there exist an affine and onto function u : X → R, and a non-
decreasing and continuous functional I : RS → R such that f  g ⇐⇒ I (u( f )) ≥ I (u(g)). Their
decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion amounts to that for each pair ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ RS , if ϕ′ = λϕ + (1 − λ)t ′
for some λ ∈ [0, 1] and some t ′ ∈ R, and if I (ϕ) = I (ϕ′), then for each t > 0, I (ϕ + t1) ≥ I (ϕ′ + t1),
which means, in the WM representation for example, that λ(ϕ + t1) ≤ λ(ϕ′ + t1).
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The validity of our axioms can be seen from their implications in the smooth
ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. (2005). A preference relation  admits a smooth
ambiguity representation if there exist an affine onto function u : X → R, an
increasing function φ : R → R, a countably additive Borel probability measure μ
over  such that for each pair f , g ∈ F ,
f  g ⇐⇒
∫
p∈
φ(E pu( f ))dμ(p) ≥
∫
p∈
φ(E pu(g))dμ(p). (19)
We denote such a representation by 〈u, φ, μ〉.
Klibanoff et al. (2005) show that in this model “attitudes toward pure risk are
characterized by the shape of u, as usual, while attitudes toward ambiguity are charac-
terized by the shape of φ,” and “one advantage of this model is that the well-developed
machinery for dealing with risk attitudes can be applied as well to ambiguity attitudes.”
We focus on the case where φ is concave so that 〈u, φ, μ〉 represents a preference rela-
tion exhibiting S-ambiguity aversion. In this case, our definitions of decreasing and
increasing absolute ambiguity aversion correspond exactly to the usual monotonicity
properties of the Arrow–Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion of φ (Arrow 1965;
Pratt 1964).
Proposition 7 Fix an affine onto function u : R → R and an increasing, concave,
and twice differentiable function φ : R → R. Each preference relation represented
by 〈u, φ, μ〉 for some countably additive Borel probability measure μ on  satisfies
A.2.1 (A.2.2) if and only if φ exhibits decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion,
i.e., −φ′′
φ′ is non-increasing (non-decreasing).
As a corollary of Proposition 7, we obtain Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b)’s charac-
terization of constant absolute ambiguity aversion in terms of constant absolute risk
aversion of φ (see their Theorem 23).
Cherbonniera and Gollier (2015) propose a definition of decreasing aversion under
ambiguity in the smooth ambiguity model. They assume that the decision maker with
initial wealth z ∈ R+ is facing N possible monetary lotteries (x˜1, . . . , x˜N ). For each
n ∈ {1, . . . , N }, x˜n occurs with probability qn . The value function of the decision
maker obeys the smooth ambiguity rule:
N∑
n=1
qnφ(Eu(z + x˜n)),
where φ is increasing and concave. According to them, the decision maker exhibits
decreasing aversion if
φ−1
( N∑
n=1
qnφ(Eu(z + x˜n))
)
= u(z)
⇒
n∑
n=1
qnφ′(Eu(z + x˜n))Eu′(z + x˜n) ≥ φ′(u(z))u′(z). (20)
123
Preferences with changing ambiguity aversion
The key difference between their definition and ours is that their definition does not
distinguish the effect of wealth on risk aversion and ambiguity aversion, while ours
captures the effect of baseline utilities on ambiguity aversion. More precisely, their
definition says that an ambiguous lottery becomes more desirable at a higher monetary
wealth level, while our axiom essentially says that it becomes more desirable at a
higher baseline utility level. When the comparison of behavior is based on changes
in baseline utilities, we are restricted to the effect of baseline utilities on ambiguity
aversion.
Indeed, they show that (20) holds if and only if both u and φ ◦ u exhibit decreas-
ing concavity, where u summarizes the decision maker’s risk attitude according to
Klibanoff et al. (2005). Instead, as shown in Proposition 7, our A.2.1 corresponds
only to the decreasing concavity of φ, the measure of the decision maker’s ambiguity
attitude.
Cherbonniera and Gollier (2015) also provide an analogous definition for decreasing
aversion in the α-maxmin expected utility model studied by Ghirardato et al. (2004).
That is,
α min
n
Eu(z + x˜n) + (1 − α) max
n
Eu(z + x˜n) ≤ u(z)
⇒ ∀z′ ≤ z, α min
n
Eu(z′ + x˜n) + (1 − α) max
n
Eu(z′ + x˜n) ≤ u(z′). (21)
With the weight α being fixed, their definition only imposes restriction on the function
u which summarizes the decision maker’s risk attitude according to Ghirardato et al.
(2004). In contrast, our axiom captures the decision maker’s changing ambiguity
attitudes, which is reflected by assigning less weight on the worst case as the baseline
utility of an act increases (see Theorem 3).
Focusing also on the effect of changes in monetary wealth, Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
(2017) provide a definition of decreasing/increasing absolute ambiguity aversion in a
general setting in which X is assumed to be a set of monetary lotteries. Given a lottery
x and a wealth level w, the transformed lottery at w, xw is defined as a lottery that
yields a payoff of c + w with the same probability as x yields c. Intuitively, xw is
the “real” lottery faced by a decision maker at the wealth level w. Given a preference
relation  and a wealth level w, they define the induced preference relation  w at
w as a preference relation that ranks acts as the initial preference relation  ranks
“real” acts that yield in each state transformed lotteries at w. Then based on the notion
of comparative ambiguity aversion introduced by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), a
preference relation  is said to exhibit decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion if for
each pair w,w′ with w′ > w,  w is more ambiguity averse than  w′ .
One implication of their definition is that if a preference relation exhibits decreasing
absolute ambiguity aversion, then it must exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. Their
definition does not allow, for example, a decision maker to exhibit both decreasing
absolute ambiguity aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion. In contrast, our
definition does not impose restrictions on a decision maker’s risk attitude and captures
changing ambiguity aversion with respect to changes in baseline utilities. Thus, we can
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accommodate the possibility that a decision maker exhibits both decreasing absolute
ambiguity aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion. In case a decision maker is
risk neutral, their definition has the same implication as ours on the representations,
since changes in monetary wealth translate directly to changes in baseline utilities.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study two extensions of the well-known MEU decision rule to accom-
modate a decision maker’s changing ambiguity attitude: a WM rule and a VC rule. Due
to the non-uniqueness of their representations, we are interested in finding canonical
representations of the two rules in terms of the smallest admissible set and the largest
essential set, respectively. We characterize a class of preference relations that admits
a canonical WM representation as well as a class that admits a canonical VC repre-
sentation. The first class of preference relations exhibits S-ambiguity aversion, while
the second exhibits GM-ambiguity aversion. In the second part of this paper, we study
the wealth effect under ambiguity. We propose axioms of decreasing (increasing and
constant) absolute and relative ambiguity aversion. Representations are provided for
the subclass of ambiguity averse preference relations exhibiting decreasing (increas-
ing and constant) absolute ambiguity aversion. The monotonic pattern of changing
ambiguity aversion is reflected in a intuitive way in both the WM representation and
the VC representation.
Appendix: Proofs
We denote by N the set of positive integers. For each ϕ ∈ RS , let ϕ∗ := max
s∈S ϕ(s) and
ϕ∗ := min
s∈S ϕ(s). A functional I : R
S → R is normalized if for each t ∈ R, I (t1) = t .
It is constant additive if for each ϕ ∈ RS and each t ∈ R, I (ϕ + t1) = I (ϕ)+ t . It is
constant superadditive if for each ϕ ∈ RS and each t ∈ R+, I (ϕ + t1) ≥ I (ϕ) + t .
Lastly, it is superadditive if for each pair ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ RS , I (ϕ + ϕ′) ≥ I (ϕ) + I (ϕ′).
Proofs in Section 3
Lemma 1 A preference relation  satisfies A.1–A.4 and A.6 if and only if there exist
an affine onto function u : X → R and a normalized, non-decreasing, and continuous
functional I : RS → R such that for each pair f , g ∈ F ,
f  g ⇐⇒ I (u( f )) ≥ I (u(g)). (22)
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation, and given u, there is a
unique normalized functional I : RS → R satisfying (22).
Proof To prove the sufficiency of the axioms, let  satisfy A.1–A.4 and A.6. Note
that A.6 implies the usual non-degeneracy axiom: There are f , g ∈ F such that
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f  g. Then by applying the same techniques of Lemma 57 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
(2011b), one can show that there exist a non-constant affine function u : X → R and
a normalized, non-decreasing, and continuous functional I : u(X)S → R satisfying
(22). Although A.5.1 is assumed in their Lemma 57, the axiom is only used to show that
I is quasi-concave, and dropping it does not affect the existence of u and I satisfying
the other properties. Moreover, since  satisfies A.6, by Lemma 29 of Maccheroni
et al. (2006), u(X) = R.
The necessity of the axioms can be readily seen, and the uniqueness follows from
routine arguments. Thus, we omit the proofs. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 1 To prove the sufficiency of the axioms, let  satisfy A.1–A.4
and A.6. By Lemma 1, there exist an affine onto function u : X → R and a normalized,
non-decreasing, and continuous functional I : RS → R satisfying (22). Then by
Propositions 1 and 5 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011a) and their proof of Proposition
5,23 there exist a non-empty, closed, and convex set D ⊆  and a function λ : RS → R
such that (i) 〈u, D〉 is a Bewley representation of the unambiguous preference relation
 ∗ induced from  , and (ii) for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
I (ϕ) = λ(ϕ) min
p∈D E pϕ + (1 − λ(ϕ)) maxp∈D E pϕ. (23)
In particular, for each ϕ ∈ RS such that min
p∈D E pϕ = maxp∈D E pϕ,
λ(ϕ) =
max
p∈D E pϕ − I (ϕ)
max
p∈D E pϕ − minp∈D E pϕ
. (24)
Since I is continuous, λ is continuous on {ϕ ∈ RS : min
p∈D E pϕ = maxp∈D E pϕ}. Thus, it
can be readily seen that 〈u, D, λ〉 is a Bewley WM representation of  .
To prove the necessity of the axioms, let  admit a Bewley WM representation
〈u, D, λ〉. Clearly,  satisfies A.1. Since u is affine, it satisfies A.2. Since u is onto,
by Lemma 29 of Maccheroni et al. (2006), it satisfies A.6.
To show that  satisfies A.3, define J : RS → R by setting for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
J (ϕ) := λ(ϕ) min
p∈D E pϕ + (1 − λ(ϕ)) maxp∈D E pϕ,
and it suffices to show that J is continuous. Let ϕ ∈ RS and {ϕn}∞n=1 be a sequence
of elements in RS such that limn→∞ ϕn = ϕ. If min
p∈D E pϕ < maxp∈D E pϕ, then λ is
continuous at ϕ, and thus, limn→∞ J (ϕn) = J (ϕ). If min
p∈D E pϕ = maxp∈D E pϕ, then
limn→∞ min
p∈D E pϕ
n = limn→∞ max
p∈D E pϕ
n = J (ϕ), and thus, limn→∞ J (ϕn) =
J (ϕ).
23 See also Propositions 4 and 5 of Ghirardato et al. (2004).
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To show that  satisfies A.4, let f , g ∈ F be such that for each s ∈ S, f (s)  g(s),
and we want to show that f  g. Since for each s ∈ S, f (s)  g(s), and since
〈u, D, λ〉 is a Bewley WM representation of  , u( f ) ≥ u(g). Then for each p ∈ D,
E pu( f ) ≥ E pu(g). Besides, by the definition of a Bewley WM representation, 〈u, D〉
is a Bewley representation of the unambiguous preference relation  ∗ induced from
 . Hence, f  ∗g. Thus, by the definition of  ∗, f  g.
Lastly, to prove the uniqueness of the representation,24 let 〈u, D, λ〉 and 〈u′, D′, λ′〉
be two Bewley WM representations of some  . Since both u and u′ are affine func-
tions representing  restricted to X , by routine arguments, u′ is a positive affine
transformation of u. Moreover, by the definition of a Bewley WM representation, both
〈u, D〉 and 〈u′, D′〉 are Bewley representations of the unambiguous preference rela-
tion  ∗ induced from  . By Proposition 5 of Ghirardato et al. (2004), D = D′.
Finally, suppose that u = u′, let ϕ ∈ RS be such that min
p∈D E pϕ = maxp∈D E pϕ, and we
want to show that λ(ϕ) = λ′(ϕ). Let f ∈ F be such that u( f ) = ϕ. Since x f ∼ f
and both 〈u, D, λ〉 and 〈u′, D′, λ′〉 are WM representations of  ,
u(x f ) = λ(u( f )) min
p∈D E pu( f ) + (1 − λ(u( f ))) maxp∈D E pu( f ), (25)
and
u′(x f ) = λ(u′( f )) min
p∈D′
E pu′( f ) + (1 − λ(u′( f ))) max
p∈D′
E pu′( f ). (26)
Since u = u′, u( f ) = ϕ, and D = D′, by (25) and (26),
λ(ϕ) min
p∈D E pϕ + (1 − λ(ϕ)) maxp∈D E pϕ = λ
′(ϕ) min
p∈D E pϕ + (1 − λ
′(ϕ)) max
p∈D E pϕ.
(27)
Since max
p∈D E pϕ = minp∈D E pϕ, by (27), λ(ϕ) = λ
′(ϕ). unionsq
Proof of Theorem 1 To show the sufficiency of the axioms, let  satisfy A.1–A.4,
A.5.1, and A.6. By the proof of Proposition 1, it admits a Bewley WM representation
〈u, D, λ〉, with I : RS → R given by (23) being non-decreasing and continuous. We
first check that λ ∈ (D). Let ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ RS . If ϕ′ ≥ ϕ, then by the monotonicity of
I , I (ϕ′) ≥ I (ϕ), which implies (3). To check (4), suppose that ϕ, ϕ′ satisfy (3), and
let ϕ′′ := ϕ+ϕ′2 . Since ϕ, ϕ′ satisfy (3), I (ϕ′) ≥ I (ϕ). Thus, by the monotonicity and
continuity of I , there is t ∈ R+ such that I (ϕ′− t1) = I (ϕ). Let f , g ∈ F be such that
u( f ) = ϕ and u(g) = ϕ′ − t1. Then I (u( f )) = I (u(g)), so f ∼ g. Since f ∼ g, by
A.5.1, 12 f + 12 g  f . Thus, I ( 12ϕ+ 12 (ϕ′−t1)) = I (u( 12 f + 12 g)) ≥ I (u( f )) = I (ϕ).
Since I is non-decreasing, I ( 12ϕ + 12ϕ′) ≥ I ( 12ϕ + 12 (ϕ′ − t1)). Thus, I (ϕ′′) ≥ I (ϕ),
which implies (4).
24 The uniqueness property here differs slightly from that in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011a). They state the
uniqueness of the representation under an additional condition that they are interested in (condition (iii) of
their Proposition 5), while the uniqueness is actually guaranteed without imposing this condition.
123
Preferences with changing ambiguity aversion
We then prove that 〈u, D, λ〉 is also a canonical WM representation of  . That is,
let 〈u′, D′, λ′〉 be another WM representation of  and we shall prove that D ⊆ D′.
Since  satisfies A.1–A.6, by Theorems 3 and 5 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b), it
admits an ambiguity averse representation 〈v, G〉, where G : R ×  → (−∞,∞] is
given by, for each (t, p) ∈ R × ,
G(t, p) = sup{v(x f ) : f ∈ F , E pv( f ) ≤ t}. (28)
Recall the set D∗ defined in (5). By Proposition 9 and Theorem 10 of Cerreia-Vioglio
et al. (2011b), 〈v, D∗〉 is a Bewley representation of the unambiguous preference
relation  ∗ induced from  . On the other hand, by the definition of a Bewley WM
representation, 〈u, D〉 is also a Bewley representation of  ∗. Thus, by Proposition 5
of Ghirardato et al. (2004), D = D∗. Hence, to show that D ⊆ D′, it is equivalent to
show that D∗ ⊆ D′.
Suppose to the contrary that D∗  D′. Since D∗ = cl({p ∈  : G(t, p) <
∞ for some t ∈ R}) and D′ is closed, there exist q ∈ \D′ and t ∈ R such that
G(t, q) < ∞. Then by a standard separation theorem, there is ϕ ∈ RS such that Eqϕ <
0 < min
p∈D′
E pϕ. Let x ∈ X be such that v(x) = t . Since Eqv(x) = t , by (28), G(t, q) ≥
v(x) = t . Let n ∈ N be such that Eqnϕ < t ≤ G(t, q) < min
p∈D′
E pnϕ. Let g ∈ F be
such that v(g) = nϕ. Since Eqv(g) = Eqnϕ < t , by (28), v(xg) ≤ G(t, q). Observe
that min
p∈D′
E pu′(g) ≤ λ′(u′(g)) min
p∈D′
E pu′(g)+(1−λ′(u′(g))) max
p∈D′
E pu′(g) = u′(xg).
Since both v and u′ are affine functions representing  restricted to X , by routine
arguments, v is a positive affine transformation of u′. Then min
p∈D′
E pv(g) ≤ v(xg).
Recall that G(t, q) < min
p∈D′
E pnϕ = min
p∈D′
E pv(g). Thus, G(t, q) < v(xg), which
contradicts v(xg) ≤ G(t, q), as desired.
To show the necessity of the axioms, let  admit a canonical WM representation
〈u, D, λ〉 with λ ∈ (D). Clearly, it satisfies A.1. Since λ ∈ (D), one can readily
verify that it satisfies A.4 and A.5.1. Recall that Proposition 1 shows the necessity
of A.2, A.3, and A.6 for a preference relation to admit a Bewley WM representation.
Since the arguments there rely on the same properties of u, D, and λ as we have here,
they can be used to show the necessity of the axioms for a preference relation to admit
a canonical WM representation.
Lastly, we show the uniqueness of a canonical WM representation 〈u, D, λ〉 of
some preference relation  . By the definition of a canonical WM representation, D
is the smallest admissible set and thus unique. As argued in the proof of the sufficiency
of the axioms, D coincides with the Bewley set. Moreover, the uniqueness of u and
λ follows from the same arguments as used for a Bewley WM representation in the
proof of Proposition 1. unionsq
Proof of Corollary 1 Let  admit an ambiguity averse representation 〈u, G〉. Define
I : RS → R by setting for each ϕ ∈ RS , I (ϕ) := min
p∈ G(E pϕ, p). By the proof
of Theorem 3 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b), I is normalized, non-decreasing, and
continuous. Moreover, by their Theorem 3,  satisfies A.5.1. Thus, by the proofs of
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Proposition 1 and Theorem 1,  admits a canonical WM representation 〈u, D∗, λ〉 in
which λ belongs to (D∗) and is given by (24) on {ϕ ∈ RS : min
p∈D∗ E pϕ = maxp∈D∗ E pϕ}.unionsq
Proposition 8 The preference relation  in Example 2 admits a Bewley weighted
maxmin representation but not a canonical weighted maxmin representation.
Proof We first prove that  admits a Bewley WM representation. By Proposition 1, it
is equivalent to prove that  satisfies A.1–A.4 and A.6. Clearly, it satisfies A.1. Since
for each t ∈ R, V (t1) = t , it satisfies A.2 and A.6.
To show that  satisfies A.3, it suffices to show the continuity of V . Let f ∈ RS
and { f n}∞n=1 be a sequence of elements in RS that converges to f . We shall show that
limn→∞ V ( f n) = V ( f ) in each of the following two cases.
Case 1: max{ f (1), f (2)} = f (3). max{ f (1), f (2)} < f (3). Then V ( f ) =
min
p∈D1
E p f . Moreover, for sufficiently large n, max{ f n(1), f n(2)} < f n(3), so
that V ( f n) = min
p∈D1
E p f n . Hence, limn→∞ V ( f n) = limn→∞ min
p∈D1
E p f n =
min
p∈D1
E p f = V ( f ). Similarly, one can show that when max{ f (1), f (2)} > f (3),
limn→∞ V ( f n) = V ( f ).
Case 2: max{ f (1), f (2)} = f (3). Then V ( f ) = min
p∈D2
E p f . Suppose that f (1) <
f (2). Thus, f (1) < f (2) = f (3) and for sufficiently large n, f n(1) < f n(2). Recall
p′′ = ( 23 , 16 , 16 ). Then p′′ ∈ D2. For each p ∈ D2, since
1
6
≥
(
p1 − 13
)2
+
(
p2 − 13
)2
+
(
p3 − 13
)2
≥
(
p1 − 13
)2
+ 2
(
1 − p1
2
− 1
3
)2
= 3
2
(
p1 − 13
)2
, (29)
p1 ≤ 23 = p′′1 . Since f (1) < f (2) = f (3), and since p′′ ∈ D2 and for each p ∈ D2,
p1 ≤ p′′1 , minp∈D2 E p f = E p′′ f = E p′ f . Then V ( f ) = minp∈D2 E p f = E p′ f , and thus,
lim
n→∞ E p′ f
n = lim
n→∞ minp∈D2
E p f n = V ( f ). (30)
For sufficiently large n, since f n(1) < f n(2), and since p′1 > q ′1 and p′3 = q ′3,
min
p∈D1
E p f n = E p′ f n , and thus,
either V ( f n) = min
p∈D1
E p f n = E p′ f n or V ( f n) = min
p∈D2
E p f n . (31)
By (30) and (31), limn→∞ V ( f n) = V ( f ). Similarly, one can show that when
f (1) > f (2), limn→∞ V ( f n) = V ( f ). Suppose that f (1) = f (2). Then f (1) =
f (2) = f (3), and thus, limn→∞ min
p∈D1
E p f n = limn→∞ min
p∈D2
E p f n = min
p∈D2
E p f =
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V ( f ). For each n ∈ N, either V ( f n) = min
p∈D1
E p f n or V ( f n) = min
p∈D2
E p f n . Thus,
limn→∞ V ( f n) = V ( f ).
Lastly, to show that  satisfies A.4, let f , g ∈ RS be such that f ≥ g. We shall
show that V ( f ) ≥ V (g) in each of the following three cases.
Case 1: Either max{ f (1), f (2)} < f (3) and max{g(1), g(2)} < g(3), or
max{ f (1), f (2)} ≥ f (3) and max{g(1), g(2)} ≥ g(3). Then either V ( f ) =
min
p∈D1
E p f and V (g) = min
p∈D1
E pg, or V ( f ) = min
p∈D2
E p f and V (g) = min
p∈D2
E pg.
In either scenario, since f ≥ g, V ( f ) ≥ V (g).
Case 2: max{ f (1), f (2)} < f (3) and max{g(1), g(2)} ≥ g(3). Then V ( f ) =
min
p∈D1
E p f and V (g) = min
p∈D2
E pg. Let f ′ ∈ RS be such that
f ′(1) = f (1), f ′(2) = f (2), f ′(3) = max{ f (1), f (2)}.
Since max{ f (1), f (2)} < f (3), f ′(3) < f (3). Thus, f ′ ≤ f . Since f ≥ g,
f ′(3) = max{ f (1), f (2)} ≥ max{g(1), g(2)} ≥ g(3). Thus, f ′ ≥ g. Consider the
sequence { 1
n
f + n−1
n
f ′}∞n=1 of elements of RS . For each n ∈ N, since max{ 1n f (1) +
n−1
n
f ′(1), 1
n
f (2) + n−1
n
f ′(2)} = max{ f (1), f (2)} < 1
n
f (3) + n−1
n
f ′(3), V ( 1
n
f +
n−1
n
f ′) = min
p∈D1
E p( 1n f + n−1n f ′). Since V is continuous (as shown when proving that
A.3 holds), V ( f ′) = limn→∞ V ( 1n f + n−1n f ′) = limn→∞ minp∈D1 E p(
1
n
f + n−1
n
f ′) =
min
p∈D1
E p f ′. Since f ′ ≤ f , min
p∈D1
E p f ′ ≤ min
p∈D1
E p f . Thus, V ( f ′) ≤ V ( f ). Since
max{ f ′(1), f ′(2)} = f ′(3) and f ′ ≥ g, V ( f ′) = min
p∈D2
E p f ′ ≥ min
p∈D2
E pg = V (g).
Hence, V ( f ) ≥ V ( f ′) ≥ V (g).
Case 3: max{ f (1), f (2)} ≥ f (3) and max{g(1), g(2)} < g(3). Then V ( f ) =
min
p∈D2
E p f and V (g) = min
p∈D1
E pg. Let f ′ ∈ RS be such that
f ′(1) =
{
f (3) if f (1) ≥ f (2),
f (1) if f (1) < f (2), f
′(2) =
{
f (2) if f (1) ≥ f (2),
f (3) if f (1) < f (2), f
′(3) = f (3).
Since max{ f (1), f (2)} ≥ f (3), f ′(1) ≤ f (1) and f ′(2) ≤ f (2). Thus, f ′ ≤ f .
Since no matter f (1) ≥ f (2) or f (1) < f (2), max{ f ′(1), f ′(2)} ≥ f ′(3), V ( f ′) =
min
p∈D2
E p f ′. Since f ′ ≤ f , min
p∈D2
E p f ′ ≤ min
p∈D2
E p f . Hence, V ( f ′) ≤ V ( f ). Let
g′ ∈ RS be such that
g′(1) =
{
g(3) if f (1) ≥ f (2),
g(1) if f (1) < f (2), g
′(2)=
{
g(2) if f (1) ≥ f (2),
g(3) if f (1) < f (2), g
′(3) = g(3).
Since max{g(1), g(2)} < g(3), g′ ≥ g and max{g′(1), g′(2)} = g′(3). Then
V (g′) = min
p∈D2
E pg′. Since f ≥ g, f ′ ≥ g′. Thus, min
p∈D2
E p f ′ ≥ min
p∈D2
E pg′.
Hence, V ( f ′) ≥ V (g′). Consider the sequence { 1
n
g + n−1
n
g′}∞n=1 of elements of
R
S
. Since max{g(1), g(2)} < g(3), for each n ∈ N, max{ 1
n
g(1)+ n−1
n
g′(1), 1
n
g(2)+
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n−1
n
g′(2)} < 1
n
g(3) + n−1
n
g′(3), and thus, V ( 1
n
g + n−1
n
g′) = min
p∈D1
E p( 1n g + n−1n g′).
Since V is continuous, V (g′) = limn→∞ V ( 1n g + n−1n g′) = limn→∞ minp∈D1 E p(
1
n
g +
n−1
n
g′) = min
p∈D1
E pg′. Since g′ ≥ g, min
p∈D1
E pg′ ≥ min
p∈D1
E pg. Thus, V (g′) ≥ V (g).
Hence, V ( f ) ≥ V ( f ′) ≥ V (g′) ≥ V (g).
Now we prove that  does not admit a canonical WM representation. Suppose to
the contrary that it admits a canonical WM representation 〈u, D, λ〉. Let D3 := {p ∈
 : p3 ≥ 14 }.
We first show that for each f ∈ RS , V ( f ) ∈ [ min
p∈D2
E p f , max
p∈D2
E p f ]. Let f ∈ RS .
Suppose that f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3). Then V ( f ) = min
p∈D1
E p f = E p′ f . Since
f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3), and since p′2 < p∗2 and p′3 < p∗3 , E p′ f ≤ E p∗ f .
Recall p′′ = ( 23 , 16 , 16 ). Since f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3), and since p′1 = p′′1 and
p′3 > p′′3 , E p′ f ≥ E p′′ f . Thus, V ( f ) ∈ [E p′′ f , E p∗ f ]. Since p′′, p∗ ∈ D2,[E p′′ f , E p∗ f ] ⊆ [ min
p∈D2
E p f , max
p∈D2
E p f ]. Hence, V ( f ) ∈ [ min
p∈D2
E p f , max
p∈D2
E p f ].
If f (2) < f (1) < f (3), by analogous arguments, V ( f ) ∈ [ min
p∈D2
E p f , max
p∈D2
E p f ].
Lastly, if max{ f (1), f (2)} ≥ f (3), then V ( f ) = min
p∈D2
E p f , and thus, V ( f ) ∈
[ min
p∈D2
E p f , max
p∈D2
E p f ].
We then show that for each f ∈ RS , V ( f ) ∈ [ min
p∈D3
E p f , max
p∈D3
E p f ]. Let f ∈ RS .
Suppose that max{ f (1), f (2)} < f (3). Then V ( f ) = min
p∈D1
E p f . Since D1 ⊆ D3,
min
p∈D1
E p f ∈ [ min
p∈D3
E p f , max
p∈D3
E p f ]. Thus, V ( f ) ∈ [ min
p∈D3
E p f , max
p∈D3
E p f ]. Sup-
pose that max{ f (1), f (2)} ≥ f (3). Then V ( f ) = min
p∈D2
E p f . Since p∗ ∈ D2 ∩ D3,
min
p∈D2
E p f ≤ E p∗ f ≤ max
p∈D3
E p f . Thus, V ( f ) ≤ max
p∈D3
E p f . To show that
V ( f ) ≥ min
p∈D3
E p f , we further consider the following three cases. First, suppose
that f (1) ≤ f (3) ≤ f (2). Recall that for each p ∈ D2, by (29), p1 ≤ 23 .
Since f (1) ≤ f (3) ≤ f (2), and since ( 34 , 0, 14 ) ∈ D3 and for each p ∈ D2,
p1 ≤ 23 < 34 , minp∈D2 E p f ≥
3
4 f (1) + 14 f (3) ≥ minp∈D3 E p f . Thus, V ( f ) ≥ minp∈D3 E p f .
Second, if f (2) ≤ f (3) ≤ f (1), by analogous arguments, V ( f ) ≥ min
p∈D3
E p f .
Lastly, if f (3) < min{ f (1), f (2)}, then min
p∈D2
E p f ≥ f (3) = min
p∈D3
E p f , and thus,
V ( f ) ≥ min
p∈D3
E p f .
We claim that D ⊆ D2 ∩ D3. To see this, define λ2 : RS → R by setting for each
f ∈ RS ,
λ2( f ) :=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
max
p∈D2
E p f − V ( f )
max
p∈D2
E p f − min
p∈D2
E p f if minp∈D2 E p f = maxp∈D2 E p f ,
1 if min
p∈D2
E p f = max
p∈D2
E p f .
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Thus, for each f ∈ RS , V ( f ) = λ2( f ) min
p∈D2
E p f + (1 − λ2( f )) max
p∈D2
E p f , and
since V ( f ) ∈ [ min
p∈D2
E p f , max
p∈D2
E p f ], λ2( f ) ∈ [0, 1]. Since V is continuous, λ2 is
continuous on { f ∈ RS : min
p∈D2
E p f = max
p∈D2
E p f }. Let v be the identity mapping on
R. It can be readily seen that 〈v, D2, λ2〉 is a weighed maxmin representation of  .
Analogously, since V ( f ) ∈ [ min
p∈D3
E p f , max
p∈D3
E p f ], one can define λ3 : RS → [0, 1]
so that 〈v, D3, λ3〉 is also a WM representation of  . Since 〈u, D, λ〉 is a canonical
WM representation of  , D ⊆ D2 ∩ D3.
Finally, to derive a contradiction, fix g ∈ RS such that g(1) < g(2) = g(3). Then
V (g) = min
p∈D2
E pg. Recall that for each p ∈ D2, by (29), p1 ≤ 23 , and it can also be
readily seen that p1 = 23 if only if p2 = p3 = 16 . Thus, V (g) = E p′′ g, and for each
p ∈ D2\{p′′}, E pg > V (g). Since p′′ /∈ D3 and D ⊆ D2 ∩ D3, D ⊆ D2\{p′′}. Thus,
min
p∈D E pg > V (g) = v(xg). Since both v and u are affine functions representing 
restricted to X , by routine arguments, u is a positive affine transformation of v. Then
min
p∈D E pu(g) > u(xg), and thus, λ(u(g)) minp∈D E pu(g)+ (1 − λ(u(g))) maxp∈D E pu(g) >
u(xg). Since 〈u, D, λ〉 is a WM representation of  , g  xg , which is not possible.
Hence, there is no canonical WM representation of  . unionsq
Proposition 9 The preference relation  in Example 3 admits both a Bewley weighted
maxmin representation and a canonical weighted maxmin representation, whereas the
Bewley set of priors for  is not the smallest admissible set.
Proof We first prove that  admits a Bewley WM representation. By Proposition 1, it
is equivalent to prove that  satisfies A.1–A.4 and A.6. Clearly, it satisfies A.1. Since
for each t ∈ R, V (t1) = t , it satisfies A.2 and A.6.
To show that  satisfies A.3, it suffices to show the continuity of V . Let
f ∈ RS and { f n}∞n=1 be a sequence of elements in RS that converges to f . Before
showing that limn→∞ V ( f n) = V ( f ), we assume first that max{ f (1), f (2)} <
f (3) and for each n ∈ N, max{ f n(1), f n(2)} < f n(3), and check that
limn→∞ α( f n) = α( f ). Suppose that f (1) < f (2) < f (3). Then α( f ) =
med{0, 1−E p′′ f1−E p′′ f +E p′ f , 1}. Moreover, for sufficiently large n, f
n(1) < f n(2) < f n(3),
so that α( f n) = med{0, 1−E p′′ f
n
1−E p′′ f n+E p′ f n , 1}. Since the median operator is continuous,
limn→∞ α( f n) = α( f ). Suppose that f (2) < f (1) < f (3). By analogous argu-
ments, limn→∞ α( f n) = α( f ). Suppose that f (1) = f (2) < f (3). Since f (1) =
f (2) < f (3), and since p′3 = q ′3 and p′′3 = q ′′3 ,
1−E p′′ f
1−E p′′ f +E p′ f =
1−Eq′′ f
1−Eq′′ f +Eq′ f . Then
α( f ) = limn→∞ med{0, 1−E p′′ f
n
1−E p′′ f n+E p′ f n , 1} = limn→∞ med{0,
1−Eq′′ f n
1−Eq′′ f n+Eq′ f n , 1}.
For each n ∈ N, either α( f n) = med{0, 1−E p′′ f
n
1−E p′′ f n+E p′ f n , 1} or α( f
n) =
med{0, 1−Eq′′ f
n
1−Eq′′ f n+Eq′ f n , 1}. Thus, limn→∞ α( f
n) = α( f ). We now show that
limn→∞ V ( f n) = V ( f ) in each of the following two cases.
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Case 1: max{ f (1), f (2)} = f (3). Suppose that max{ f (1), f (2)} < f (3). Then
V ( f ) = min
p∈D1( f )
E p f . Moreover, for sufficiently large n, max{ f n(1), f n(2)} <
f n(3), so that V ( f n) = min
p∈D1( f n)
E p f n . Since α is continuous at f , D1 is con-
tinuous (i.e., both upper and lower hemicontinuous) at f . Thus, by the maximum
theorem, limn→∞ V ( f n) = V ( f ). Suppose that max{ f (1), f (2)} > f (3). Then
V ( f ) = min
p∈D2
E p f . Moreover, for sufficiently large n, max{ f n(1), f n(2)} > f n(3),
so that V ( f n) = min
p∈D2
E p f n . Thus, limn→∞ V ( f n) = V ( f ).
Case 2: max{ f (1), f (2)} = f (3). Then V ( f ) = min
p∈D2
E p f . Suppose that f (1) <
f (2). Thus, f (1) < f (2) = f (3) and for sufficiently large n, f n(1) < f n(2). Recall
that as shown in the proof of Proposition 8, for each p ∈ D2, by (29), p1 ≤ 23 = p′′1 ,
and thus, min
p∈D2
E p f = E p′′ f = E p′ f . Then
lim
n→∞ E p′ f
n = lim
n→∞ E p′′ f
n = lim
n→∞ minp∈D2
E p f n = V ( f ). (32)
For sufficiently large n, since f n(1) < f n(2), and since p′1 > q ′1, p′′1 > q ′′1 , p′3 = q ′3,
and p′′3 = q ′′3 , for each β ∈ [0, 1], Eβ p′+(1−β)p′′ f n < Eβq ′+(1−β)q ′′ f n , and thus,
either V ( f n) = min
p∈D1( f n)
E p f n = α( f n)E p′ f n + (1 − α( f n))E p′′ f n
or V ( f n) = min
p∈D2
E p f n . (33)
By (32) and (33), limn→∞ V ( f n) = V ( f ). Similarly, one can show that when
f (1) > f (2), limn→∞ V ( f n) = V ( f ). Suppose that f (1) = f (2). Then f (1) =
f (2) = f (3), and thus, for each p ∈ , limn→∞ E p f n = limn→∞ min
p∈D2
E p f n =
min
p∈D2
E p f = V ( f ). For each n ∈ N, either V ( f n) = Eα( f n)p′+(1−α( f n))p′′ f n , or
V ( f n) = Eα( f n)q ′+(1−α( f n))q ′′ f n , or V ( f n) = min
p∈D2
E p f n . Thus, limn→∞ V ( f n) =
V ( f ).
Lastly, we show that  satisfies A.4. To facilitate our proof, we first derive an
equivalent expression of V . Let f ∈ RS . Suppose that f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3). Since
f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3), and since p′1 = p′′1 and p′3 > p′′3 , E p′ f > E p′′ f . Thus,
α( f ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if E p′ f ≤ 0,
1 − E p′′ f
1 − E p′′ f + E p′ f if E p
′ f > 0 and E p′′ f < 1,
0 if E p′′ f ≥ 1.
Moreover, since f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3), and since p′1 > q ′1, p′′1 > q ′′1 , p′3 = q ′3, and
p′′3 = q ′′3 , for each β ∈ [0, 1], Eβ p′+(1−β)p′′ f < Eβq ′+(1−β)q ′′ f . Thus,
V ( f ) = min
p∈D1( f )
E p f = Eα( f )p′+(1−α( f ))p′′ f = α( f )E p′ f + (1 − α( f ))E p′′ f .
(34)
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Similarly, if f (2) < f (1) < f (3), then
α( f ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if Eq ′ f ≤ 0,
1 − Eq ′′ f
1 − Eq ′′ f + Eq ′ f if Eq
′ f > 0 and Eq ′′ f < 1,
0 if Eq ′′ f ≥ 1,
and V ( f ) = α( f )Eq ′ f + (1 − α( f ))Eq ′′ f .
Hence, for each f ∈ RS ,
V ( f ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
E p′ f if f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3) and E p′ f ≤ 0,
E p′ f
1 − E p′′ f + E p′ f if f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3), E p
′ f > 0, and E p′′ f < 1,
E p′′ f if f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3) and E p′′ f ≥ 1,
Eq ′ f if f (2) < f (1) < f (3) and Eq ′ f ≤ 0,
Eq ′ f
1 − Eq ′′ f + Eq ′ f if f (2) < f (1) < f (3), Eq
′ f > 0, and Eq ′′ f < 1,
Eq ′′ f if f (2) < f (1) < f (3) and Eq ′′ f ≥ 1,
min
p∈D2
E p f max{ f (1), f (2)} ≥ f (3).
Now let f , g ∈ RS be such that f ≥ g. We shall show that V ( f ) ≥ V (g) in each
of the following four cases.
Case 1: Either f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3) and g(1) ≤ g(2) < g(3), or f (2) < f (1) <
f (3) and g(2) < g(1) < g(3). Consider the former scenario first. Suppose that
E p′ f ≤ 0. Then V ( f ) = E p′ f and E p′ g ≤ E p′ f ≤ 0. Thus, V (g) = E p′ g ≤ V ( f ).
Suppose that E p′ f > 0 and E p′′ f < 1. Then V ( f ) = E p′ f1−E p′′ f +E p′ f > 0 and
E p′′ g ≤ E p′′ f < 1. If E p′ g ≤ 0, then V (g) = E p′ g ≤ 0 < V ( f ). If E p′ g > 0, then
V (g) = E p′ g1−E p′′ g+E p′ g ≤
E p′ f
1−E p′′ f +E p′ f = V ( f ), where the inequality holds since
0 < E p′ g ≤ E p′ f and 0 < 1 − E p′′ f ≤ 1 − E p′′ g. Suppose that E p′′ f ≥ 1. Then
V ( f ) = E p′′ f ≥ 1. If E p′ g ≤ 0, then V (g) = E p′ g ≤ 0 < 1 ≤ V ( f ). If E p′ g > 0
and E p′′ g < 1, then V (g) = E p′ g1−E p′′ g+E p′ g < 1 ≤ V ( f ). If E p′′ g ≥ 1, then V (g) =
E p′′ g ≤ E p′′ f = V ( f ). In the latter scenario, by analogous arguments, V ( f ) ≥ V (g).
Case 2: max{ f (1), f (2)} ≥ f (3) and max{g(1), g(2)} ≥ g(3). Then V ( f ) =
min
p∈D2
E p f ≥ min
p∈D2
E pg = V (g).
Case 3: Either f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3) and g(2) < g(1) < g(3), or f (2) < f (1) <
f (3) and g(1) ≤ g(2) < g(3). Consider the former scenario first. Let f ′ ∈ RS be
such that
f ′(1) = f (1), f ′(2) = f (1), f ′(3) = f (3).
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Then f ≥ f ′ ≥ g. Since f ≥ f ′, and since f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3) and
f ′(1) = f ′(2) < f ′(3), by the result of Case 1, V ( f ) ≥ V ( f ′). Consider the sequence
{ n−1
n
f ′ + 1
n
g}∞n=1 of elements in RS . For each n ∈ N, since f ′ ≥ g, n−1n f ′ + 1n g ≥ g;
since f ′(2) = f ′(1) < f ′(3) and g(2) < g(1) < g(3), n−1
n
f ′(2) + 1
n
g(2) <
n−1
n
f ′(1) + 1
n
g(1) < n−1
n
f ′(3) + 1
n
g(3). For each n ∈ N, since n−1
n
f ′ + 1
n
g ≥ g,
and since n−1
n
f ′(2) + 1
n
g(2) < n−1
n
f ′(1) + 1
n
g(1) < n−1
n
f ′(3) + 1
n
g(3) and
g(2) < g(1) < g(3), by the result of Case 1, V ( n−1
n
f ′ + 1
n
g) ≥ V (g). Since V is con-
tinuous (as shown when proving that A.3 holds), V ( f ′) = limn→∞ V ( n−1n f ′ + 1n g).
Thus, V ( f ′) ≥ V (g). Hence, V ( f ) ≥ V ( f ′) ≥ V (g). In the latter scenario, by
analogous arguments, V ( f ) ≥ V (g).
Case 4: Either max{ f (1), f (2)} < f (3) and max{g(1), g(2)} ≥ g(3), or
max{ f (1), f (2)} ≥ f (3) and max{g(1), g(2)} < g(3). Consider the former scenario
first. Let f ′ ∈ RS be such that
f ′(1) = f (1), f ′(2) = f (2), f ′(3) = max{ f (1), f (2)}.
Then f ≥ f ′ ≥ g and max{ f ′(1), f ′(2)} = f ′(3). Since f ′ ≥ g, and since
max{ f ′(1), f ′(2)} = f ′(3) and max{g(1), g(2)} ≥ g(3), by the result of Case 2,
V ( f ′) ≥ V (g). Consider the sequence { n−1
n
f ′ + 1
n
f }∞n=1 of elements in RS . For each
n ∈ N, since f ≥ f ′, f ≥ n−1
n
f ′ + 1
n
f ; since f ′(3) = max{ f (1), f (2)} < f (3),
max{ n−1
n
f ′(1) + 1
n
f (1), n−1
n
f ′(2) + 1
n
f (2)} = max{ f (1), f (2)} < n−1
n
f ′(3) +
1
n
f (3). For each n ∈ N, since f ≥ n−1
n
f ′ + 1
n
f , and since max{ f (1), f (2)} < f (3)
and max{ n−1
n
f ′(1) + 1
n
f (1), n−1
n
f ′(2) + 1
n
f (2)} < n−1
n
f ′(3) + 1
n
f (3), by the
results of Cases 1 and 3, V ( f ) ≥ V ( n−1
n
f ′ + 1
n
f ). Since V is continuous, V ( f ′) =
limn→∞ V ( n−1n f ′ + 1n f ). Thus, V ( f ) ≥ V ( f ′). Hence, V ( f ) ≥ V ( f ′) ≥ V (g). In
the latter scenario, by similar arguments, V ( f ) ≥ V (g).
Now we prove that  admits a canonical WM representation with D := D2∩{p ∈
 : p3 ≥ 16 } being the smallest admissible set. Let f ∈ RS . We first show that
V ( f ) ∈ [min
p∈D E p f , maxp∈D E p f ] in each of the following two cases.
Case 1: Either f (1) ≤ f (2) < f (3) or f (2) < f (1) < f (3). Consider
the former scenario first. Then E p′′ f < E p′ f < E p∗ f , and as shown in (34),
V ( f ) = α( f )E p′ f + (1 − α( f ))E p′′ f . Thus, V ( f ) ∈ [E p′′ f , E p∗ f ]. Since
V ( f ) ∈ [E p′′ f , E p∗ f ] and p′′, p∗ ∈ D, V ( f ) ∈ [min
p∈D E p f , maxp∈D E p f ]. In the latter
scenario, by analogous arguments, V ( f ) ∈ [min
p∈D E p f , maxp∈D E p f ].
Case 2: Either f (1) ≤ f (2) and f (3) ≤ f (2), or f (1) > f (2) and f (3) ≤ f (1).
Consider the former scenario first. Then V ( f ) = min
p∈D2
E p f . Since p∗ ∈ D2 and
p∗ ∈ D, V ( f ) ≤ E p∗ f ≤ max
p∈D E p f . To show that V ( f ) ≥ minp∈D E p f , sup-
pose to the contrary that V ( f ) < min
p∈D E p f . Then f is not a constant act. Let
p¯ ∈ arg min
p∈D2
E p f . Then E p¯ f = V ( f ) < min
p∈D E p f . Thus, p¯ /∈ D, i.e., p¯3 <
1
6 .
Recall that as argued in the proof of Proposition 8, for each p ∈ D2, by (29), p1 ≤ 23 ,
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and p1 = 23 if and only if p2 = p3 = 16 . Since p¯ ∈ D2 and p¯3 < 16 , p¯1 < 23 .
Since f (1), f (3) ≤ f (2) and f is not a constant act, and since p¯1 < 23 = p′′1
and p¯3 < 16 = p′′3 , E p¯ f > E p′′ f . Since p′′ ∈ D2, E p′′ f ≥ minp∈D2 E p f . Thus,
E p¯ f > min
p∈D2
E p f , which contradicts p¯ ∈ arg min
p∈D2
E p f . In the latter scenario, by
analogous arguments, V ( f ) ∈ [min
p∈D E p f , maxp∈D E p f ].
Next, we show that  admits a WM representation with D being an admissible
set. Since for each f ∈ RS , V ( f ) ∈ [min
p∈D E p f , maxp∈D E p f ], there is λ : R
S → [0, 1]
such that for each f ∈ RS , V ( f ) = λ( f ) min
p∈D E p f + (1 − λ( f )) maxp∈D E p f . Since
V is continuous, λ is continuous on { f ∈ RS : min
p∈D E p f = maxp∈D E p f }. Let u be the
identity mapping on R. Then 〈u, D, λ〉 is a WM representation of .
We then show that D is actually the smallest admissible set, so that 〈u, D, λ〉 is a
canonical WM representation of . Let 〈u′, D′, λ′〉 be another WM representation of
. To show that D ⊆ D′, suppose to the contrary that there is p¯ ∈ D\D′. By a standard
separation theorem, there is a non-constant act f¯ ∈ RS such that E p¯ f¯ < min
p∈D′
E p f¯ .
Let t ∈ R be such that E p′′( f¯ + t1) ≥ 1 and Eq ′′( f¯ + t1) ≥ 1. We claim that
V ( f¯ +t1) ≤ E p¯( f¯ +t1). To see this, suppose first max{ f¯ (1)+t, f¯ (2)+t} ≥ f¯ (3)+t .
Then V ( f¯ + t1) = min
p∈D2
E p( f¯ + t1). Since p¯ ∈ D and D ⊆ D2, min
p∈D2
E p( f¯ + t1) ≤
E p¯( f¯ + t1). Thus, V ( f¯ + t1) ≤ E p¯( f¯ + t1). Suppose next that f¯ (1)+ t ≤ f¯ (2)+ t <
f¯ (3)+ t . Since f¯ (1)+ t ≤ f¯ (2)+ t < f¯ (3)+ t and E p′′( f¯ + t1) ≥ 1, V ( f¯ + t1) =
E p′′( f¯ + t1). Recall that as argued in the proof of Proposition 8, for each p ∈ D2,
p1 ≤ 23 . Since p¯ ∈ D2, p¯1 ≤ 23 = p′′1 . Since p¯ ∈ D, p¯3 ≥ 16 = p′′3 . Since f¯ (1) + t ≤
f¯ (2) + t < f¯ (3) + t , and since p¯1 ≤ p′′1 and p¯3 ≥ p′′3 , E p′′( f¯ + t1) ≤ E p¯( f¯ + t1).
Thus, V ( f¯ +t1) ≤ E p¯( f¯ +t1). Lastly, if f¯ (2)+t < f¯ (1)+t < f¯ (3)+t , by analogous
arguments as in the case f¯ (1)+ t ≤ f¯ (2)+ t < f¯ (3)+ t , V ( f¯ + t1) ≤ E p¯( f¯ + t1).
Since V ( f¯ + t1) ≤ E p¯( f¯ + t1) and E p¯ f¯ < min
p∈D′
E p f¯ , V ( f¯ + t1) < min
p∈D′
E p( f¯ +
t1). Recall that u is the identity mapping on R. Thus, u(x f¯ +t1) < minp∈D′
E p( f¯ + t1).
Since both u and u′ are affine functions representing  restricted to X , by routine argu-
ments, u′ is a positive affine transformation of u. Then u′(x f¯ +t1) < minp∈D′
E pu′( f¯ +
t1) ≤ λ′(u′( f¯ + t1)) min
p∈D′
E pu′( f¯ + t1) + (1 − λ′(u′( f¯ + t1))) max
p∈D′
E pu′( f¯ + t1).
Since 〈u′, D′, λ′〉 is a WM representation of , f¯ + t1  x f¯ +t1, which is not possible.
Hence, D ⊆ D′, as desired.
Finally, we show that D is not the Bewley set. Suppose to the contrary that D
is the Bewley set. That is, there is a WM representation 〈u′′, D, λ′′〉 of  such
that 〈u′′, D〉 is a Bewley representation of the unambiguous preference relation
 ∗ induced from  . Then u′′ is a positive affine transformation of the iden-
tity mapping u. Observe that p′ /∈ D2. Thus, p′ /∈ D. By a standard separation
theorem, there is a non-constant act f ′ ∈ RS such that E p′ f ′ < min
p∈D E p f
′
. Let
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x := min
p∈D E p f
′
. Thus, E p′ f ′ < x and min
p∈D E pu
′′( f ′) = u′′(x). Let g ∈ RS be
such that g(1) < g(2) < g(3), f ′(1) + g(1) < f ′(2) + g(2) < f ′(3) + g(3), and
E p′(x1 + g) ≤ 0. Since E p′ f ′ < x , E p′( 12 f ′ + 12 g) < E p′( 12 x1 + 12 g) ≤ 0. Then
V ( 12 f ′ + 12 g) = E p′( 12 f ′ + 12 g) < E p′( 12 x1+ 12 g) = V ( 12 x + 12 g). Thus, 12 x + 12 g 
1
2 f ′ + 12 g. Since 〈u′′, D〉 is a Bewley representation of  ∗, and since for each p ∈ D,
E pu′′( f ′) ≥ min
p∈D E pu
′′( f ′) = u′′(x), f ′ ∗ x . Thus, 12 f ′ + 12 g  12 x + 12 g, which
contradicts 12 x + 12 g  12 f ′ + 12 g. Hence, D is not the Bewley set. unionsq
Lemma 2 Let ϕ ∈ RS, t ∈ [ϕ∗, ϕ∗], and B := {p ∈  : E pϕ = t}. Let K be a non-
empty closed subset of  such that for each p ∈ K , E pϕ ≥ t . Let c := min
p∈B d(p, K ).
Then min
p∈:d(p,K )≤c E pϕ = t .
Proof Let p¯ ∈ B be such that d( p¯, K ) = c. Since p¯ ∈ B, E p¯ϕ = t . Since
d( p¯, K ) = c, E p¯ϕ ≥ min
p∈:d(p,K )≤c E pϕ. Thus, t ≥ minp∈:d(p,K )≤c E pϕ. Suppose that
t > min
p∈:d(p,K )≤c E pϕ. Let p
′ ∈  and q ′ ∈ K be such that d(p′, q ′) = d(p′, K ) ≤ c
and E p′ϕ = min
p∈:d(p,K )≤c E pϕ. Then t > E p
′ϕ. Since q ′ ∈ K and for each p ∈ K ,
E pϕ ≥ t , Eq ′ϕ ≥ t . Since Eq ′ϕ ≥ t > E p′ϕ, p′ = q ′ and there is α ∈ [0, 1) such that
t = Eα p′+(1−α)q ′ϕ. Thus, α p′+(1−α)q ′ ∈ B and d(α p′+(1−α)q ′, q ′) < d(p′, q ′).
Hence,
c = min
p∈B d(p, K ) ≤ d(α p
′ + (1 − α)q ′, q ′) < d(p′, q ′) = d(p′, K ) ≤ c,
which is not possible. Hence, t = min
p∈:d(p,K )≤c E pϕ. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2 To prove the sufficiency of the axioms, let  satisfy A.1–A.4,
A.5.2, and A.6. By Lemma 1, there exist an affine onto function u : X → R and a
normalized, non-decreasing, and continuous functional I : RS → R satisfying (22).
Let K := {p ∈  : for each ϕ ∈ RS, I (ϕ) ≤ E pϕ}. Equivalently, K is the
benchmark set. The equivalence has been shown by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002)
for biseparable preference relations (see their Theorem 12). It can be readily seen that
their proof applies here. Since K is the benchmark set, by A.5.2, K is non-empty.
Since I is continuous, K is closed. By the definition of K , it is convex.
Define B : RS ⇒  and σ : RS → R+ by setting for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
B(ϕ) := {p ∈  : I (ϕ) = E pϕ},
and
σ(ϕ) := min
p∈B(ϕ) d(p, K ). (35)
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For each ϕ ∈ RS , it can be readily seen that B(ϕ) is closed, and since I is normalized
and non-decreasing, I (ϕ) ∈ [ϕ∗, ϕ∗], so that B(ϕ) is non-empty. Thus, σ is well-
defined. Since I is non-decreasing, σ ∈ 	(K ). Moreover, by Lemma 2, for each
ϕ ∈ RS , I (ϕ) = min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(ϕ) E pϕ. Thus, by (22), for each pair f , g ∈ F ,
f  g ⇐⇒ min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(u( f )) E pu( f ) ≥ minp∈:d(p,K )≤σ(u(g)) E pu(g),
Therefore, if we can show that σ : RS → R+ is continuous on {u( f ) ∈ RS : f ∈
F , f  x∗ f } and lower semicontinuous on {u( f ) ∈ RS : f ∈ F , f ∼ x∗ f }, then
〈u, K , σ 〉 is a VC representation of  .
To show the continuity property of σ , let ϕ ∈ RS and f ∈ F be such that u( f ) = ϕ,
and let {ϕn}∞n=1 be a sequence of elements in RS such that limn→∞ ϕn = ϕ. Suppose
first that f  x∗ f . Then by (22), I (u( f )) = I (u(x∗ f )), and thus, I (ϕ) = I (ϕ∗1).
Since I (ϕ) = I (ϕ∗1), and since I is normalized and non-decreasing, ϕ∗ < I (ϕ) ≤ ϕ∗.
We shall show that limn→∞ σ(ϕn) = σ(ϕ) in each of the following two cases.
Case 1: I (ϕ) = ϕ∗. Let q∗ ∈ K . By the definition of K , I (ϕ) ≤ Eq∗ϕ.
Since I (ϕ) ≤ Eq∗ϕ ≤ ϕ∗ = I (ϕ), Eq∗ϕ = I (ϕ). Thus, q∗ ∈ B(ϕ). Since
q∗ ∈ K and q∗ ∈ B(ϕ), σ(ϕ) = min
p∈B(ϕ) d(p, K
∗) = d(q∗, q∗) = 0. To show
that limn→∞ σ(ϕn) = 0, suppose to the contrary that there exist  > 0 and a subse-
quence {ϕnm }∞m=1 of {ϕn}∞n=1 such that for each m ∈ N, σ(ϕnm ) > . Let q∗ ∈  be
such that Eq∗ϕ = ϕ∗. Since I (ϕ) > ϕ∗, I (ϕ) > Eq∗ϕ. Thus, q∗ /∈ K . Let α ∈ (0, 1)
be such that d(αq∗ + (1 − α)q∗, q∗) < . Since q∗ ∈ K , d(αq∗ + (1 − α)q∗, K ) ≤
d(αq∗ + (1 − α)q∗, q∗) < . Then for each m ∈ N, d(αq∗ + (1 − α)q∗, K ) <
σ(ϕnm ), and thus, I (ϕnm ) = min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(ϕnm ) E pϕ
nm ≤ Eαq∗+(1−α)q∗ϕnm . Since
I is continuous, I (ϕ) = limm→∞ I (ϕnm ). Thus, I (ϕ) = limm→∞ I (ϕnm ) ≤
limm→∞ Eαq∗+(1−α)q∗ϕnm = αEq∗ϕ + (1 − α)Eq∗ϕ = αϕ∗ + (1 − α)I (ϕ) < I (ϕ),
which contradicts I (ϕ) = ϕ∗, as desired.
Case 2: ϕ∗ < I (ϕ) < ϕ∗. To show the continuity of σ at ϕ, by the maximum
theorem, it suffices to show the continuity of the correspondence B at ϕ. To show
the upper hemicontinuity of B at ϕ, let p¯ ∈  and let {pn}∞n=1 be a sequence of
elements in  such that limn→∞ pn = p¯ and for each n ∈ N, pn ∈ B(ϕn). We shall
show that p¯ ∈ B(ϕ). For each n ∈ N, since pn ∈ B(ϕn), E pn ϕn = I (ϕn). Thus,
E p¯ϕ = limn→∞ E pn ϕn = limn→∞ I (ϕn), and since I is continuous, E p¯ϕ = I (ϕ).
Hence, p¯ ∈ B(ϕ). To show the lower hemicontinuity of B at ϕ, let p¯ ∈ B(ϕ). We shall
show that there exist a sequence {pm}∞m=1 and a subsequence {ϕnm }∞m=1 of {ϕn}∞n=1
such that limm→∞ pm = p¯ and for each m ∈ N, pm ∈ B(ϕnm ). Since p¯ ∈ B(ϕ),
E p¯ϕ = I (ϕ). For each  > 0, let A() := {p ∈  : d(p, p¯) ≤ }. For each  > 0,
since ϕ∗ < E p¯ϕ = I (ϕ) < ϕ∗, min
p∈A() E pϕ < I (ϕ) < maxp∈A() E pϕ, and since I is
continuous, for sufficiently large n, min
p∈A() E pϕ
n < I (ϕn) < max
p∈A() E pϕ
n
. Thus, for
each  > 0, when n is sufficiently large, there is p ∈ A() such that E pϕn = I (ϕn),
so that p ∈ A() ∩ B(ϕn). Thus, there exist a sequence {pm}∞m=1 and a subsequence
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{ϕnm }∞m=1 of {ϕn}∞n=1 such that for each m ∈ N, pm ∈ A( 1m )∩ B(ϕnm ). Since for each
m ∈ N, pm ∈ A( 1
m
), limm→∞ pm = p¯.
Now suppose that f ∼ x∗ f . We want to show that lim inf
n→∞ σ(ϕ
n) ≥ σ(ϕ). Since
for each n ∈ N, σ(ϕn) ≥ 0, lim inf
n→∞ σ(ϕ
n) ≥ 0. If ϕ is constant, then B(ϕ) = ,
and thus, σ(ϕ) = min
p∈B(ϕ) d(p, K
∗) = 0 ≤ lim inf
n→∞ σ(ϕ
n). Suppose that ϕ is not
constant. Suppose to the contrary that lim inf
n→∞ σ(ϕ
n) < σ(ϕ). Then there is a convergent
subsequence {ϕnm }∞m=1 of {ϕn}∞n=1 such that limm→∞ σ(ϕnm ) < σ(ϕ). Let t ∈ R be
such that limm→∞ σ(ϕnm ) < t < σ(ϕ). For each p ∈  such that d(p, K ) ≤ t , since
σ(ϕ) = min
q∈B(ϕ) d(q, K ) > t , p /∈ B(ϕ), and thus, E pϕ = I (ϕ). Since f ∼ x∗ f , by
(22), I (ϕ) = I (u( f )) = I (u(x∗ f )) = I (ϕ∗1), and since I is normalized, I (ϕ) = ϕ∗.
For each p ∈  such that d(p, K ) ≤ t , since E pϕ = I (ϕ) and E pϕ ≥ ϕ∗ = I (ϕ),
E pϕ > I (ϕ). Thus,
min
p∈:d(p,K )≤t E pϕ > I (ϕ). (36)
Since limm→∞ σ(ϕnm ) < t , for sufficiently large m, min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(ϕnm ) E pϕ
nm ≥
min
p∈:d(p,K )≤t E pϕ
nm
. Since I is continuous, and since for each m ∈ N, I (ϕnm ) =
min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(ϕnm ) E pϕ
nm
, I (ϕ) = limm→∞ I (ϕnm ) = limm→∞ min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(ϕnm )
E pϕnm . Thus,
I (ϕ) = lim
m→∞ minp∈:d(p,K )≤σ(ϕnm ) E pϕ
nm ≥ lim
m→∞ minp∈:d(p,K )≤t E pϕ
nm
= min
p∈:d(p,K )≤t E pϕ,
which contradicts (36), as desired.
We complete the proof of the sufficiency of the axioms by showing that K is
actually the largest essential set, so that 〈u, K , σ 〉 is a canonical VC representa-
tion of  . Let 〈u′, K ′, σ ′〉 be another VC representation of  . To show that
K ′ ⊆ K , let p′ ∈ K ′ and ϕ ∈ RS . By the definition of K , it is equivalent for us
to show that I (ϕ) ≤ E p′ϕ. Let f ∈ F such that u( f ) = ϕ. Since 〈u′, K ′, σ ′〉 is
a VC representation of  , u′(x f ) = min
p∈:d(p,K ′)≤σ ′(u′( f ))
E pu′( f ). Since p′ ∈ K ′,
min
p∈:d(p,K ′)≤σ ′(u′( f ))
E pu′( f ) ≤ E p′u′( f ). Thus, u′(x f ) ≤ E p′u′( f ). Since both u
and u′ are affine functions representing  restricted to X , by routine arguments, u′ is
a positive affine transformation of u. Thus, u(x f ) ≤ E p′u( f ). Since I is normalized,
by (22), I (ϕ) = I (u( f )) = I (u(x f )) = u(x f ). Hence, I (ϕ) ≤ E p′ϕ.
To prove the necessity of the axioms, let  admit a canonical VC representation
〈u, K , σ 〉 with σ ∈ 	(K ). Clearly, it satisfies A.1. Since u is affine, it satisfies A.2.
Since σ ∈ 	(K ), one can readily verify that it satisfies A.4. Since u is onto, by Lemma
29 of Maccheroni et al. (2006), it satisfies A.6.
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To show that  satisfies A.3, define C : RS ⇒  and J : RS → R by setting for
each ϕ ∈ RS ,
C(ϕ) := {p ∈  : d(p, K ) ≤ σ(ϕ)},
and
J (ϕ) := min
p∈C(ϕ) E pϕ,
and it suffices to show that J is continuous. Let ϕ ∈ RS and {ϕn}∞n=1 be a sequence
of elements in RS such that limn→∞ ϕn = ϕ. If ϕ is constant, then for each n ∈ N,
|J (ϕn) − J (ϕ)| ≤ sup
s∈S
|ϕn(s) − ϕ(s)|, and thus, 0 ≤ limn→∞ |J (ϕn) − J (ϕ)| ≤
limn→∞ sup
s∈S
|ϕn(s) − ϕ(s)| = 0, so that limn→∞ J (ϕn) = J (ϕ). Suppose that ϕ is
not constant. Let f ∈ F be such that u( f ) = ϕ. We shall show that limn→∞ J (ϕn) =
J (ϕ) in each of the following two cases.
Case 1: f  x∗ f . Then σ is continuous at ϕ. To show the continuity of J at ϕ, by
the maximum theorem, it suffices to show the continuity of the correspondence C at
ϕ.
To show the upper hemicontinuity of C at ϕ, let p¯ ∈  and let {pn}∞n=1 be a sequence
of elements in  such that limn→∞ pn = p¯ and for each n ∈ N, pn ∈ C(ϕn). We shall
show that p¯ ∈ C(ϕ). For each n ∈ N, since pn ∈ C(ϕn), d(pn, K ) ≤ σ(ϕn). Since
d(·, K ) is continuous on  and σ is continuous at ϕ, d( p¯, K ) = limn→∞ d(pn, K )
and σ(ϕ) = limn→∞ σ(ϕn). Thus, d( p¯, K ) ≤ σ(ϕ). Hence, p ∈ C(ϕ).
To show the lower hemicontinuity of C at ϕ, let p¯ ∈ C(ϕ). We shall show that there
is a sequence {pn}∞n=1 such that limn→∞ pn = p¯ and for each n ∈ N, pn ∈ C(ϕn).
Since p¯ ∈ C(ϕ), d( p¯, K ) ≤ σ(ϕ). Let q ∈ K be such that d( p¯, q) = d( p¯, K ). Then
d( p¯, q) ≤ σ(ϕ). For each n ∈ N, let
pn :=
{
p¯ if d( p¯, q) ≤ σ(ϕn),
nq + (1 − n) p¯ if d( p¯, q) > σ(ϕn),
where n ∈ (0, 1] is such that d(nq + (1 − n) p¯, q) = σ(ϕn). Then for each
n ∈ N, d(pn, K ) ≤ d(pn, q) ≤ σ(ϕn), and thus, pn ∈ C(ϕn). Moreover, for each
n ∈ N, if pn = p¯, then d( p¯, pn) = 0; if pn = nq + (1 − n) p¯, then d(pn, q) =
d(nq+(1−n) p¯, q) = σ(ϕn) < d( p¯, q), and thus d( p¯, pn) = d( p¯, q)−d(pn, q) =
d( p¯, q)−σ(ϕn) ≤ σ(ϕ)−σ(ϕn). Then by the continuity of σ at ϕ, limn→∞ pn = p¯.
Case 2: f ∼ x∗ f . Then σ is lower semicontinuous at ϕ. To show the continuity of
J at ϕ, suppose to the contrary that there exist  > 0 and a subsequence {ϕnm }∞m=1
of {ϕn}∞n=1 such that for each m ∈ N, |J (ϕnm ) − J (ϕ)| > . Since f ∼ x∗ f , and
since 〈u, K , σ 〉 is a VC representation of  , J (u( f )) = J (u(x∗ f )) = ϕ∗. Thus,
J (ϕ) = ϕ∗, and for each m ∈ N, |J (ϕnm ) − ϕ∗| > . Then for sufficiently large m,
|J (ϕnm ) − ϕnm∗ | > 2 , and since J is non-decreasing, J (ϕnm ) − ϕnm∗ = |J (ϕnm ) −
ϕ
nm∗ | > 2 . Let α ∈ (0, 1) be such that α(ϕ∗ − ϕ∗) < 2 . Then for sufficiently large m,
α(ϕnm∗ − ϕnm∗ ) < 2 < J (ϕnm )− ϕnm∗ , and thus, (1 − α)ϕnm∗ + αϕnm∗ < J (ϕnm ). Let
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B∞ := {p ∈  : E pϕ = (1 − α)ϕ∗ + αϕ∗}, and for each m ∈ N, Bm := {p ∈  :
E pϕnm = (1 − α)ϕnm∗ + αϕnm∗}. Observe that B∞ is non-empty and closed, and so
is Bm for each m ∈ N. Moreover, for sufficiently large m, if p ∈ Bm , then E pϕnm =
(1−α)ϕnm∗ +αϕnm∗ < J (ϕnm ), so by the definition of J , p /∈ C(ϕnm ), and thus, by the
definition of C , d(p, K ) > σ(ϕnm ). Hence, for sufficiently large m, min
p∈Bm d(p, K ) >
σ(ϕnm ). Thus, lim inf
m→∞ minp∈Bm d(p, K ) ≥ lim infm→∞ σ(ϕ
nm ) ≥ lim inf
n→∞ σ(ϕ
n). Since ϕ is
not constant, min
p∈B∞ d(p, K ) = limm→∞ minp∈Bm d(p, K ), using similar arguments as in
showing the continuity of σ defined by (35) in the case of ϕ∗ < I (ϕ) < ϕ∗.25 Since
σ is lower semicontinuous at ϕ, lim inf
n→∞ σ(ϕ
n) ≥ σ(ϕ). Thus, min
p∈B∞ d(p, K ) ≥ σ(ϕ).
Let c := min
p∈B∞ d(p, K ). Then c ≥ σ(ϕ). Hence,
min
p∈:d(p,K )≤c E pϕ ≤ minp∈C(ϕ) E pϕ = J (ϕ) = ϕ∗ < (1 − α)ϕ∗ + αϕ
∗, (37)
where the last inequality holds since ϕ is not constant and α ∈ (0, 1). Observe that for
each p ∈ K and each m ∈ N, p ∈ C(ϕnm ), so that J (ϕnm ) ≤ E pϕnm . Thus, for each
p ∈ K , when m is sufficiently large, (1 − α)ϕnm∗ + αϕnm∗ < J (ϕnm ) ≤ E pϕnm , and
hence E pϕ = limm→∞ E pϕnm ≥ limm→∞(1−α)ϕnm∗ +αϕnm∗ = (1−α)ϕ∗ +αϕ∗.
By lemma 2, min
p∈:d(p,K )≤c E pϕ = (1−α)ϕ∗+αϕ
∗
, which contradicts (37), as desired.
To show that  satisfies A.5.2, let q ∈ K . Let  q be the SEU preference relation
defined by setting for each pair f , g ∈ F , f  q g ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
qs f (s) 
∑
s∈S
qs g(s).
We shall show that  is more ambiguity averse than the SEU preference relation
 q . Let f ∈ F and x ∈ X be such that x  q f . Then x 
∑
s∈S
qs f (s). Since
〈u, K , σ 〉 is a varaint constraint representation of  and since u is affine, u(x) ≥
u(
∑
s∈S
qs f (s)) = Equ( f ). Since q ∈ K , Equ( f ) ≥ min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(u( f )) E pu( f ). Then
u(x) ≥ min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(u( f )) E pu( f ), and thus, x  f .
Lastly, to prove the uniqueness of the representation, let 〈u, K , σ 〉 and 〈u′, K ′, σ ′〉
be two canonical VC representations of some preference relation  . By routine argu-
ments, u′ is a positive affine transformation of u. By the definition of a canonical
VC representation, K is the largest essential set, and so is K ′. Thus, K = K ′.
As argued in the proof of the sufficiency of the axioms, K coincides with the
benchmark set. Finally, suppose that u = u′, let f ∈ F be such that f  x∗ f ,
and we want to show that σ(u( f )) = σ ′(u′( f )). Let ϕ := u( f ). Suppose that
σ(ϕ) < σ ′(ϕ). Let p∗, q ∈  be such that E p∗ϕ = ϕ∗, Eqϕ = minp∈:d(p,K )≤σ(ϕ) E pϕ,
and d(q, K ) ≤ σ(ϕ). Since 〈u, K , σ 〉 is a VC representation of  , and since
f  x∗ f , u(x f ) = min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(u( f )) E pu( f ) = u(x∗ f ) = ϕ∗. Thus, Eqϕ =
u(x f ) = ϕ∗. Since d(q, K ) ≤ σ(ϕ) < σ ′(ϕ) and d(·, K ) is continuous on , there
25 In the proof of the sufficiency of the axioms, the arguments used in showing the continuity of σ at ϕ in the
case ϕ∗ < I (ϕ) < ϕ∗ (Case 2) can be applied here by taking for each ϕ′ ∈ RS , I (ϕ′) = αϕ′∗ + (1−α)ϕ′∗.
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is  ∈ (0, 1) such that d( p∗ + (1 − )q, K ) < σ ′(ϕ). Thus, min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ ′(ϕ)
E pϕ ≤
E p∗+(1−)qϕ = ϕ∗ + (1 − )Eqϕ = u(x f ). Since 〈u′, K ′, σ ′〉 is a VC representa-
tion of  , and since u = u′, K = K ′, and min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ ′(ϕ)
E pϕ = u(x f ), f  x f ,
which is a contradiction. By analogous arguments, σ(ϕ) > σ ′(ϕ) is not possible.
Hence, σ(ϕ) = σ ′(ϕ), or equivalently, σ(u( f )) = σ(u′( f )). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose that  admits both a canonical WM representation
〈u, D, λ〉 and a canonical VC representation 〈u′, K , σ 〉. To show that K ⊆ D, sup-
pose to the contrary that there is q ∈ K\D. Since q /∈ D, by a standard separation
theorem, there is ϕ ∈ RS such that Eqϕ < min
p∈D E pϕ. Let f ∈ F and x ∈ X be
such that u( f ) = ϕ and u(x) = min
p∈D E pϕ. Since both u and u
′ are affine functions
representing  restricted to X , by routine arguments, u′ is a positive affine trans-
formation of u. Thus, u′(x) = min
p∈D E pu
′( f ) > Equ′( f ). Since q ∈ K , Equ′( f ) ≥
min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(u′( f ))
E pu′( f ). Hence, u′(x) > min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(u′( f ))
E pu′( f ), and since
〈u′, K , σ 〉 is a VC representation of  , x  f . Since 〈u, D, λ〉 is a WM representation
of  , and since
u(x) = min
p∈D E pϕ = minp∈D E pu( f ) ≤ λ(u( f )) minp∈D E pu( f )
+ (1 − λ(u( f ))) max
p∈D E pu( f ),
f  x , which contradicts x  f , as desired. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 To prove the “only if” direction, let  be a MEU preference
relation. Thus, there exist an affine onto function u : RS → R and a non-empty,
closed, and convex set D ⊆  such that for each pair f , g ∈ F , f  g ⇐⇒
min
p∈D E pu( f ) ≥ minp∈D E pu(g). It is known that a MEU preference relation satisfies
A.1–A.4, A.5.1, A.5.2, and A.6. By Ghirardato et al. (2004),  admits a Bewley WM
representation with D being the Bewley set.26 By Theorem 1, it admits a canonical
WM representation with the smallest admissible set being the Bewley set. Thus, D is
the smallest admissible set, and when λ : RS → [0, 1] is a constant function equal
to 1, 〈u, D, λ〉 is a canonical WM representation of  . Moreover, by Ghirardato and
Marinacci (2002), D is the benchmark set.27 By Theorem 2,  admits a canonical
VC representation with the largest essential set being the benchmark set. Thus, D is
the largest essential set, and when σ : RS → R+ is a constant function equal to 0,
〈u, D, σ 〉 is a canonical VC representation of  .
To prove the “if” direction, let  admit both a canonical WM representation
〈u, D, λ〉 and a canonical VC representation 〈u′, K , σ 〉 with K = D. To show
26 See their Theorem 11 and the first paragraph of their Section 5.1. The same result was reported by Klaus
Nehring in his talk “Preference and Belief without the Independence Axiom” at the LOFT2 conference in
Torino (Italy), December 1996.
27 See their Corollary 14.
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that  is a MEU preference relation, it suffices to show that for each f ∈ F ,
λ(u( f )) = 1. Let f ∈ F . Since 〈u′, K , σ 〉 is a VC representation of  , u′(x f ) =
min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(u′( f ))
E pu′( f ). Since both u and u′ are affine functions representing
 restricted to X , by routine arguments, u is a positive affine transformation of
u′. Thus, u(x f ) = min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(u′( f ))
E pu( f ) ≤ min
p∈K E pu( f ). Since 〈u, D, λ〉 is a
WM representation of  , and since K = D, u(x f ) = λ(u( f )) min
p∈K E pu( f ) + (1 −
λ(u( f ))) max
p∈K E pu( f ) ≥ minp∈K E pu( f ). Thus, u(x f ) = minp∈K E pu( f ), or equivalently,
λ(u( f )) = 1. unionsq
Proof of Corollary 2 Let  admit an ambiguity averse representation 〈u, G〉. Define
I : RS → R by setting for each ϕ ∈ RS , I (ϕ) := min
p∈ G(E pϕ, p). By the proof
of Theorem 3 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b), I is normalized, non-decreasing,
and continuous. Moreover, by their Proposition 11, K ∗ = ⋂
x∈X
π(x) where π(·) is
defined in (17). Thus, p ∈ K ∗ if and only if for each x ∈ X and each f ∈ F ,
u(x) ≥ E pu( f ) 	⇒ x  f . Then by definition, K ∗ is the benchmark set. Since K ∗
is the benchmark set and K ∗ = ∅,  satisfies A.5.2. Thus, by the proof of Theorem 2,
 admits a canonical VC representation 〈u, K ∗, σ 〉 in which σ belongs to 	(K ∗) and
is given by (35). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 Let  admit a multiplier representation 〈u, q, θ〉. Equivalently,
 admits an ambiguity averse representation 〈u, G〉 such that for each (t, p) ∈ R×,
G(t, p) = t + θ R(p||q).28 It can be readily seen that K ∗ = {q}, and
D∗ =
{
{p ∈  : p  q} if θ < ∞,
{q} if θ = ∞.
Define I : RS → R by setting for each ϕ ∈ RS , I (ϕ) := min
p∈[E pϕ + θ R(p||q)].
When θ < ∞, by the variational formula (see, e.g., Proposition 1.4.2 of Dupuis and
Ellis (1997)), for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
I (ϕ) = −θ log Eqe− ϕθ . (38)
By the proof of Corollary 1,  admits a canonical WM representation 〈u, D∗, λ〉 in
which λ is given by (24) on {ϕ ∈ RS : min
p∈D∗ E pϕ = maxp∈D∗ E pϕ}. Suppose that θ < ∞.
Then D∗ = {p ∈  : p  q} and for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
min
p∈D∗ E pϕ = mins∈S:qs>0 ϕ(s) and maxp∈D∗ E pϕ = maxs∈S:qs>0 ϕ(s). (39)
For each ϕ ∈ RS , if min
p∈D∗ E pϕ = maxp∈D∗ E pϕ, then by substituting (38) and (39)
into (24), we know that the value of λ(ϕ) is given by (10), and if min
s∈S:qs>0
ϕ(s) =
28 See Theorem 24 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b).
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max
s∈S:qs>0
ϕ(s), it can be readily seen that λ(ϕ) can take any value including that given
by (10). Suppose that θ = ∞. Then D∗ = {q} and for each ϕ ∈ RS , min
p∈D∗ E pϕ =
max
p∈D∗ E pϕ = Eqϕ = I (ϕ). It can be readily seen that λ can take any value and we
simply let λ be a constant function equal to 1.
Since K ∗ = {q} = ∅, by the proof of Corollary 2,  admits a canonical VC
representation 〈u, K ∗, σ 〉 in which σ is given by (35). For each ϕ ∈ RS , if θ < ∞,
then by substituting (38) into (35), we know that the value of σ(ϕ) is given by (11),
and if θ = ∞, then by substituting I (ϕ) = Eqϕ into (35), σ(ϕ) = 0. unionsq
Proofs in Section 4
Lemma 3 A preference relation  satisfies A.1, A.2.1, A.3, A.4, A.5.1, and A.6 if
and only if there exist an affine onto function u : X → R and a normalized, non-
decreasing, quasi-concave, continuous, and constant superadditive functional I :
R
S → R satisfying (22). Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation,
and given u, there is a unique normalized functional I : RS → R satisfying (22).
Proof To prove the sufficiency of the axioms, let  satisfy A.1, A.2.1, A.3, A.4, A.5.1,
and A.6. Note that A.2.1 implies A.2. Then by applying the same techniques of Lemma
57 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b), one can show that there exist a non-constant
affine function u : X → R and a normalized, non-decreasing, quasi-concave, and
continuous functional I : u(X)S → R satisfying (22). Moreover, since  satisfies
A.6, by Lemma 29 of Maccheroni et al. (2006), u(X) = R. Thus, we only need to
check that I is constant superadditive.
Let ϕ ∈ RS and t ∈ R+. Since u(X) = R, there are x, y ∈ X and f ∈ F such that
u(x) = 0, u(y) = 2t , and u( f ) = 2ϕ. Then u( 12 f + 12 y) = ϕ+ t1 and u( 12 f + 12 x) =
ϕ. Since u is affine and onto, there is z ∈ X satisfying u( 12 f + 12 x) = u( 12 z + 12 x), so
that 12 f + 12 x ∼ 12 z + 12 x . Since t ≥ 0, y  x . Then by A.2.1, 12 f + 12 y  12 z + 12 y.
Thus,
I (ϕ + t1) = I
(
u
(
1
2
f + 1
2
y
))
≥ I
(
u
(
1
2
z + 1
2
y
))
= 1
2
u(z) + 1
2
u(y) = 1
2
u(z) + 1
2
u(x) + 1
2
u(y) = u
(
1
2
z + 1
2
x
)
+ t
= I
(
u
(
1
2
f + 1
2
x
))
+ t = I (ϕ) + t .
Hence, I is constant superadditive.
The necessity of the axioms can be readily seen, and the uniqueness follows from
routine arguments. Thus, we omit the proofs. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 3 Assume first that  satisfies A.1, A.2.1, A.3, A.4, A.5.1, and
A.6, i.e., statement 1 holds. We will prove three representation results, respectively,
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in statements 2, 3, and 4. When proving each representation result, we will also prove
the additional properties of the representation stated in the end of Theorem 3.
Since  satisfies A.1, A.2.1, A.3, A.4, A.5.1, and A.6, by Lemma 3, there exist
an affine onto function u : X → R and a normalized, non-decreasing, quasi-concave,
continuous, and constant superadditive functional I : RS → R satisfying (22).
We first prove that statement 2 holds. The following observations will be useful.
Let ϕ ∈ RS . First, for each k > 0 and each t ∈ R, 1k [I (kϕ − t1) + t] ∈ [ϕ∗, ϕ∗]. This
can be readily shown by the fact that I is normalized and non-decreasing. Second,
for each k > 0, 1k [I (kϕ − t1) + t] is non-increasing in t on R since I is constant
superadditive. Third, limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ − t1) + t] is non-increasing in k on (0,∞). To
see this, suppose to the contrary that there are k, k′ ∈ (0,∞) such that k < k′ and
limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ − t1)+ t] < limt→∞ 1k′ [I (k′ϕ − t1)+ t]. Hence, there is t¯ ∈ R such
that for each pair t, t ′ ∈ [t¯,∞), 1k [I (kϕ − t1) + t] < 1k′ [I (k′ϕ − t ′1) + t ′]. That is,
I (kϕ − t1) < k
k′
I (k′ϕ − t ′1) − t + k
k′
t ′. (40)
Pick t, t ′ ≥ t¯ such that kk′ (−t ′) + (1 − kk′ )I (k′ϕ − t ′1) = −t . Thus, kϕ − t1 =
k
k′ (k
′ϕ − t ′1) + (1 − kk′ )I (k′ϕ − t ′1)1. Since I is normalized and quasi-concave, and
by the choice of t, t ′, we have
I (kϕ − t1) ≥ I (k′ϕ − t ′1) = k
k′
I (k′ϕ − t ′1) − t + k
k′
t ′,
which contradicts (40), as desired.
Define J : RS → R by setting for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
J (ϕ) := lim
k→∞ limt→∞
1
k
[I (kϕ − t1) + t]. (41)
Because of the three observations above, J is well-defined, and for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
I (ϕ) ≥ J (ϕ). Since I is normalized, so is J . Since I is non-decreasing, so is J .
By definition, J is constant additive and positive homogeneous of degree 1. We now
check that J is superadditive. Suppose to the contrary that there are ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ RS
such that J (ϕ + ϕ′) < J (ϕ) + J (ϕ′). Since J is positive homogeneous of degree 1,
J ( 12ϕ + 12ϕ′) < 12 J (ϕ) + 12 J (ϕ′). Thus, there is k > 0 and t¯ ∈ R such that whenever
t, t ′, t ′′ ≥ t¯ ,
1
k
[
I
(
k
(
1
2
ϕ + 1
2
ϕ′
)
− t ′′1
)
+ t ′′
]
<
1
2k
[I (kϕ−t1) + t] + 1
2k
[I (kϕ′ − t ′1) + t ′].
(42)
Let t, t ′ ≥ t¯ be such that I (kϕ− t1) = I (kϕ′ − t ′1). Let t ′′ = t+t ′2 . Then (42) becomes
I
(
1
2
(kϕ − t1) + 1
2
(kϕ′ − t ′1)
)
<
1
2
I (kϕ − t1) + 1
2
I (kϕ′ − t ′1). (43)
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Since I (kϕ − t1) = I (kϕ′ − t ′1) and I is quasi-concave,
I
(
1
2
(kϕ − t1) + 1
2
(kϕ′ − t ′1)
)
≥ 1
2
I (kϕ − t1) + 1
2
I (kϕ′ − t ′1),
which contradicts (43), as desired.
Since J is normalized, non-decreasing, constant additive, positive homogeneous of
degree 1, and superadditive, by Lemma 3.5 of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), there
is a unique non-empty, closed, and convex set D ⊆  such that for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
J (ϕ) = min
p∈D E pϕ.
Fix ϕ ∈ RS . We claim that I (ϕ) ∈ [min
p∈D E pϕ, maxp∈D E pϕ]. Since I (ϕ) ≥ J (ϕ) and
J (ϕ) = min
p∈D E pϕ, I (ϕ) ≥ minp∈D E pϕ. To see that I (ϕ) ≤ maxp∈D E pϕ, let t ∈ R be such
that I (ϕ) = I (−ϕ + t1). Since I (ϕ) = I (−ϕ + t1) and I is quasi-concave,
I
(
1
2
ϕ + 1
2
(−ϕ + t1)
)
≥ 1
2
I (ϕ) + 1
2
I (−ϕ + t1). (44)
Since I is normalized, I ( 12ϕ+ 12 (−ϕ+ t1)) = 12 t . Since I (−ϕ+ t1) ≥ minp∈D E p(−ϕ+
t1), 12 I (ϕ) + 12 I (−ϕ + t1) ≥ 12 I (ϕ) + 12 minp∈D E p(−ϕ) +
1
2 t . Thus, by (44),
1
2
t ≥ 1
2
I (ϕ) + 1
2
min
p∈D E p(−ϕ) +
1
2
t,
which implies that I (ϕ) ≤ − min
p∈D E p(−ϕ) = maxp∈D E pϕ.
Define λ : RS → [0, 1] by setting for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
λ(ϕ) :=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
max
p∈D E pϕ − I (ϕ)
max
p∈D E pϕ − minp∈D E pϕ
if min
p∈D E pϕ = maxp∈D E pϕ,
1 if min
p∈D E pϕ = maxp∈D E pϕ.
By the definition of λ, for each ϕ ∈ RS , I (ϕ) = λ(ϕ) min
p∈D E pϕ+(1−λ(ϕ)) maxp∈D E pϕ.
Since I is continuous, λ is continuous on {ϕ ∈ RS : min
p∈D E pϕ = maxp∈D E pϕ}. Thus,
〈u, D, λ〉 is a WM representation of  . By the same arguments as in the first paragraph
of the proof of Theorem 1, λ ∈ (D). Since I is constant superadditive, for each
ϕ ∈ RS , λ(ϕ + t1) is non-increasing in t on R. By the third observation in the second
paragraph, for each ϕ ∈ RS , limt→∞ λ(kϕ − t1) is non-decreasing in k on (0,∞).
Moreover, since for each ϕ ∈ RS , limk→∞ limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ − t1) + t] = J (ϕ) =
min
p∈D E pϕ, it can be readily shown that limk→∞ limt→∞ λ(kϕ − t1) = 1.
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Now we show that D is the smallest admissible set. Since A.2.1 implies A.2, 
satisfies A.1–A.4, A.5.1, and A.6. Thus, by Theorem 1, there is a canonical WM rep-
resentation 〈u′, D′, λ′〉 of  , where D′ coincides with the Bewley set, and moreover,
the uniqueness property of the representation implies that we can assume u′ = u. To
show that D is the smallest admissible set, it suffices to show that D ⊆ D′. Since D
and D′ are closed and convex, by Proposition A.1 of Ghirardato et al. (2004), it is
sufficient to show that for each pair ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ RS , if for each p ∈ D′, E pϕ ≥ E pϕ′,
then for each p ∈ D, E pϕ ≥ E pϕ′.
Let ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ RS and g, g′ ∈ F be such that ϕ = u(g), ϕ′ = u(g′), and for
each p ∈ D′, E pϕ ≥ E pϕ′. Let α ∈ (0, 1] and h ∈ F . For each k > 0 and
t ∈ R, let gk,t , g′k,t ∈ F be such that u(gk,t ) = ku(αg + (1 − α)h) − t1 and
u(g′k,t ) = ku(αg′ + (1 − α)h) − t1. For each k > 0, each t ∈ R, and each p ∈
D′, since E pu(g) = E pϕ ≥ E pϕ′ = E pu(g′), E pu(gk,t ) ≥ E pu(g′k,t ). Since
〈u, D′, λ′〉 is a WM representation of  with D′ being the Bewley set, 〈u, D′〉 is
a Bewley representation of the unambiguous preference relation  ∗ induced from
 . Thus, for each k > 0 and each t ∈ R, gk,t  ∗g′k,t , and hence, gk,t  g′k,t . For
each k > 0 and each t ∈ R, since gk,t  g′k,t , I (u(gk,t )) ≥ I (u(g′k,t )), and thus,
I (ku(αg + (1 − α)h) − t1) ≥ I (ku(αg′ + (1 − α)h) − t1). Hence,
J (u(αg + (1 − α)h))
= lim
k→∞ limt→∞
1
k
[I (ku(αg + (1 − α)h) − t1) + t]
≥ lim
k→∞ limt→∞
1
k
[I (ku(αg′ + (1 − α)h) − t1) + t]
= J (u(αg′ + (1 − α)h)).
Define  ′ on F by setting for each pair f , f ′ ∈ F ,
f  ′ f ′ ⇐⇒ min
p∈D E pu( f ) ≥ minp∈D E pu( f
′).
Let  ′∗ be the unambiguous preference relation induced from  ′. Since J (u(αg +
(1 − α)h)) ≥ J (u(αg′ + (1 − α)h)), and since for each f ∈ F , we have shown
that J (u( f )) = min
p∈D E pu(p), αg + (1 − α)h 
′αg′ + (1 − α)h. Since αg + (1 −
α)h  ′αg′ + (1 − α)h, and since α ∈ (0, 1] and h ∈ F are arbitrarily chosen,
g  ′∗g′. By Ghirardato et al. (2004),29 for each p ∈ D, E pu(g) ≥ E pu(g′), and
thus, E pϕ ≥ E pϕ′, as desired.
Next, we prove that statement 3 holds. By the similar arguments as in the second
paragraph, we obtain the following observations. Let ϕ ∈ RS . First, for each k > 0 and
each t ∈ R, 1k [I (kϕ + t1) − t] ∈ [ϕ∗, ϕ∗]. Second, for each k > 0, 1k [I (kϕ + t1) − t]
is non-decreasing in t on R. Third, limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ + t1) − t] is non-increasing in k
on (0,∞).
29 See the first paragraph on p.151 of Ghirardato et al. (2004).
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Define J ′ : RS → R by setting for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
J ′(ϕ) := lim
k↘0 limt→∞
1
k
[I (kϕ + t1) − t]. (45)
Because of the three observations above, J ′ is well-defined, and for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
I (ϕ) ≤ J ′(ϕ). Moreover, by the similar arguments as in the third paragraph, J ′ is
normalized, non-decreasing, constant additive, positive homogeneous of degree 1,
and superadditive. Thus, by Lemma 3.5 of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), there is
a unique non-empty, closed, and convex set K ⊆  such that for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
J ′(ϕ) = min
p∈K E pϕ.
We show that K = {p ∈  : for each ϕ ∈ RS, I (ϕ) ≤ E pϕ}. Since for each
p′ ∈ K and each ϕ ∈ RS , I (ϕ) ≤ J ′(ϕ) = min
p∈K E pϕ ≤ E p′ϕ, K ⊆ {p ∈  :
for each ϕ ∈ RS, I (ϕ) ≤ E pϕ}. To show that {p ∈  : for each ϕ ∈ RS, I (ϕ) ≤
E pϕ} ⊆ K , suppose to the contrary that there is p′ ∈ \K such that for each
ϕ ∈ RS , I (ϕ) ≤ E p′ϕ. Then for each ϕ ∈ RS , each k > 0, and each t ∈ R,
I (kϕ+ t1) ≤ E p′(kϕ+ t1) = k E p′ϕ+ t , and thus, 1k [I (kϕ+ t1)− t] ≤ E p′ϕ. Hence,
for each ϕ ∈ RS , min
p∈K E pϕ = J
′(ϕ) = limk↘0 limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ + t1) − t] ≤ E p′ϕ.
However, since p′ /∈ K , by a standard separation theorem, there is ϕ′ ∈ RS such that
E p′ϕ′ < min
p∈K E pϕ
′
, which contradicts that for each ϕ ∈ RS , min
p∈K E pϕ ≤ E p′ϕ, as
desired.
Define B : RS ⇒  and σ : RS → R+ by setting for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
B(ϕ) := {p ∈  : I (ϕ) = E pϕ},
and
σ(ϕ) := min
p∈B(ϕ) d(p, K ).
Since K is non-empty and K = {p ∈  : for each ϕ ∈ RS, I (ϕ) ≤ E pϕ}, the latter
set is also non-empty. Then by the same arguments as in the proof of the sufficiency of
the axioms in Theorem 2, 〈u, K , σ 〉 is a canonical VC representation of  , and for
each ϕ ∈ RS , I (ϕ) = min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(ϕ) E pϕ. Moreover, by the analogous arguments
as in the first paragraph of the proof of Theorem 1, σ ∈ 	¯(K ).
To complete the proof that statement 1 implies statement 3, we fix an arbitrary
ϕ ∈ RS and show the following three properties of σ . First, σ(ϕ+t1) is non-increasing
in t on R. Let t, t ′ ∈ R be such that t ≤ t ′. We want to show that σ(ϕ+t1) ≥ σ(ϕ+t ′1).
Let p∗ ∈ B(ϕ + t1) be such that d(p∗, K ) = min
p∈B(ϕ+t1) d(p, K ). By the definition of
σ , d(p∗, K ) = σ(ϕ + t1). Since p∗ ∈ B(ϕ + t1), by the definition of B, I (ϕ + t1) =
E p∗(ϕ + t1). Since I (ϕ + t1) = E p∗(ϕ + t1) and t ≤ t ′, and since I is constant
superadditive, I (ϕ+t ′1) ≥ E p∗(ϕ+t ′1). Assume first that I (ϕ+t ′1) = E p∗(ϕ+t ′1).
Then p∗ ∈ B(ϕ + t ′1), and thus, σ(ϕ + t1) = d(p∗, K ) ≥ min
p∈B(ϕ+t ′1)
d(p, K ) =
σ(ϕ + t ′1), as desired. Assume now that I (ϕ + t ′1) > E p∗(ϕ + t ′1). Suppose to the
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contrary that σ(ϕ + t1) < σ(ϕ + t ′1). Then d(p∗, K ) = σ(ϕ + t1) < σ(ϕ + t ′1).
Thus, I (ϕ + t ′1) = min
p∈:d(p,K )≤σ(ϕ+t ′1)
E p(ϕ + t ′1) ≤ E p∗(ϕ + t ′1) < I (ϕ + t ′1),
which is not possible. Hence, σ(ϕ + t1) ≥ σ(ϕ + t ′1).
Second, limt→∞ σ(kϕ + t1) is non-decreasing in k on (0,∞). For each k > 0,
define Bk : [0,∞] ⇒  by setting for each t ∈ [0,∞],
Bk(t) :=
{
B(kϕ + t1) if t < ∞,
{p ∈  : lim
t→∞
1
k [I (kϕ + t1) − t] = E pϕ} if t = ∞.
Thus, for each k > 0 and each t ∈ R, σ(kϕ + t1) = min
p∈Bk (t)
d(p, K ). Before proving
the second property of σ , we first fix k > 0 and show that limt→∞ σ(kϕ + t1) =
min
p∈Bk (∞)
d(p, K ), or equivalently, limt→∞ min
p∈Bk (t)
d(p, K ) = min
p∈Bk (∞)
d(p, K ).
By the maximum theorem, it suffices to prove that Bk is continuous at ∞. The
upper hemicontinuity can be readily seen, and thus, we omit the proof. For the lower
hemicontinuity, let {tn}∞n=1 be a sequence of elements in R+ such that limn→∞ tn =∞. Fix p∞ ∈ Bk(∞). We will show that there is a sequence {pn}∞n=1 of elements in 
such that for each n ∈ N, pn ∈ Bk(tn), and limn→∞ pn = p∞. Since p∞ ∈ Bk(∞),
limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ+t1)−t] = E p∞ϕ. For each n ∈ N, by the first observation in the first
paragraph of our proof for statement 1 implying statement 3, 1k [I (kϕ+tn1)−tn] ≥ ϕ∗,
and by the second observation, 1k [I (kϕ + tn1) − tn] ≤ limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ + t1) − t] =
E p∞ϕ. Let p∗ ∈  be such that E p∗ϕ = ϕ∗. For each n ∈ N, since E p∗ϕ = ϕ∗ ≤
1
k [I (kϕ + tn1) − tn] ≤ E p∞ϕ, if ϕ∗ < E p∞ϕ, then there is a unique αn ∈ [0, 1]
satisfying that
1
k
[I (kϕ + tn1) − tn] = Eαn p∗+(1−αn)p∞ϕ, (46)
and if ϕ∗ = E p∞ϕ, each αn ∈ [0, 1] satisfies (46), and we choose αn := 0 in this case.
Let for each n ∈ N, pn := αn p∗ + (1 − αn)p∞. Thus, for each n ∈ N, pn ∈  and
1
k [I (kϕ+ tn1)− tn] = E pn ϕ, the latter of which implies that I (kϕ+ tn1) = E pn (kϕ+
tn1), i.e., pn ∈ Bk(tn). When ϕ∗ < E p∞ϕ, since limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ+ t1)− t] = E p∞ϕ,
limn→∞ pn = p∞. When ϕ∗ = E p∞ϕ, by definition, for each n ∈ N, pn = p∞, so
that limn→∞ pn = p∞.
To show that second property of σ , let k, k′ > 0 be such that k ≤ k′. We want
to show that limt→∞ σ(kϕ + t1) ≤ limt→∞ σ(k′ϕ + t1). By the above result, it
is equivalent to show that min
p∈Bk (∞)
d(p, K ) ≤ min
p∈Bk′ (∞)
d(p, K ). Let p∗ ∈ Bk(∞),
p∗′ ∈ Bk′(∞) and q∗, q∗′ ∈ K be such that d(p∗, q∗) = min
p∈Bk (∞)
d(p, K ) and
d(p∗′, q∗′) = min
p∈Bk′ (∞)
d(p, K ). We want to show that d(p∗, q∗) ≤ d(p∗′, q∗′).
Since p∗ ∈ Bk(∞) and p∗′ ∈ Bk′(∞), limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ + t1) − t] = E p∗ϕ and
limt→∞ 1k′ [I (k′ϕ + t1) − t] = E p∗′ϕ. By the third observation, limt→∞ 1k′ [I (k′ϕ +
t1)− t] ≤ limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ+ t1)− t], and thus, E p∗′ϕ ≤ E p∗ϕ. By the definition of J ′
in (45) and the third observation again, limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ + t1)− t] ≤ J ′(ϕ), and thus,
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E p∗ϕ ≤ J ′(ϕ). Since J ′(ϕ) = min
p∈K E pϕ and q
∗′ ∈ K , J ′(ϕ) ≤ Eq∗′ϕ. Then E p∗′ϕ ≤
E p∗ϕ ≤ J ′(ϕ) ≤ Eq∗′ϕ. Hence, there isα ∈ [0, 1] such that E p∗ϕ = Eα p∗′+(1−α)q∗′ϕ,
and thus, limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ + t1) − t] = Eα p∗′+(1−α)q∗′ϕ, i.e., α p∗′ + (1 − α)q∗′ ∈
Bk(∞). Since α p∗′+(1−α)q∗′ ∈ Bk(∞) and q∗′ ∈ K , min
p∈Bk (∞)
d(p, K ) ≤ d(α p∗′+
(1−α)q∗′, q∗′). Thus, d(p∗, q∗) = min
p∈Bk (∞)
d(p, K ) ≤ d(α p∗′ + (1−α)q∗′, q∗′) =
αd(p∗′, q∗′) ≤ d(p∗′, q∗′), as desired.
The last property of σ is that limk↘0 limt→∞ σ(kϕ + t1) = 0. Let p∗ ∈  be such
that E p∗ϕ = ϕ∗. Let q∗ ∈ K be such that Eq∗ϕ = minp∈K E pϕ. For each k > 0 and
each t ∈ R, since J ′(kϕ + t1) = min
p∈K E p(kϕ + t1) = k Eq∗ϕ + t and J
′(kϕ + t1) ≥
I (kϕ + t1), k Eq∗ϕ + t ≥ I (kϕ + t1); since I is normalized and non-decreasing,
I (kϕ + t1) ≥ kϕ∗ + t . Hence, for each k > 0 and each t ∈ R, k Eq∗ϕ + t ≥
I (kϕ + t1) ≥ kϕ∗ + t = k E p∗ϕ + t .
Assume that Eq∗ϕ = E p∗ϕ. Then for each k > 0 and each t ∈ R, k Eq∗ϕ +
t = k E p∗ϕ + t , and since k Eq∗ϕ + t ≥ I (kϕ + t1) ≥ k E p∗ϕ + t , I (kϕ + t1) =
k Eq∗ϕ + t = Eq∗(kϕ + t1), i.e., q∗ ∈ B(kϕ + t1). Since for each k > 0 and each
t ∈ R, q∗ ∈ B(kϕ + t1) and q ∈ K , σ(kϕ + t1) = min
p∈B(kϕ+t1) d(p, K ) = 0. Thus,
limk↘0 limt→∞ σ(kϕ + t1) = 0.
Assume that Eq∗ϕ > E p∗ϕ. For each k > 0 and each t ∈ R, since k Eq∗ϕ + t ≥
I (kϕ + t1) ≥ k E p∗ϕ + t , Eq∗ϕ ≥ 1k [I (kϕ + t1)− t] ≥ E p∗ϕ. Hence, for each k > 0,
Eq∗ϕ ≥ limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ + t1) − t] ≥ E p∗ϕ. Since Eq∗ϕ > E p∗ϕ, for each k > 0,
αk := 1Eq∗ϕ − E p∗ϕ
[
Eq∗ϕ − lim
t→∞
1
k
[I (kϕ + t1) − t]
]
is well-defined. It can be readily seen that for each k > 0, αk ∈ [0, 1] and
Eαk p∗+(1−αk )q∗ϕ = limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ + t1) − t]. For each k > 0, recall the definition
of Bk(∞) in the proof of the second property of σ , and recall our previous result that
limt→∞ σ(kϕ + t1) = min
p∈Bk (∞)
d(p, K ). For each k > 0, since Eαk p∗+(1−αk )q∗ϕ =
limt→∞ 1k [I (kϕ+ t1)− t], αk p∗+(1−αk)q∗ ∈ Bk(∞), and moreover, since q∗ ∈ K ,
min
p∈Bk (∞)
d(p, K ) ≤ d(αk p∗ + (1 − αk)q∗, q∗). Thus, for each k > 0,
0 ≤ lim
t→∞ σ(kϕ + t1) = minp∈Bk (∞) d(p, K ) ≤ d(αk p∗ + (1 − αk)q
∗, q∗) = αkd(p∗, q∗).
(47)
Since J ′(ϕ) = min
p∈K E pϕ = Eq∗ϕ and by the definition of J
′ in (45), limk↘0 limt→∞
1
k [I (kϕ + t1) − t] = Eq∗ϕ. Thus,
lim
k↘0 αk =
1
Eq∗ϕ − E p∗ϕ
[
Eq∗ϕ − lim
k↘0 limt→∞
1
k
[I (kϕ + t1) − t]
]
= 1
Eq∗ϕ − E p∗ϕ
[Eq∗ϕ − Eq∗ϕ] = 0.
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Thus, by taking the limits with respect to k on both sides of (47),
0 ≤ lim
k↘0 limt→∞ σ(kϕ + t1) ≤ 0,
which implies that limk↘0 limt→∞ σ(kϕ + t1) = 0, as desired.
Lastly, we prove that statement 4 holds. Since A.2.1 implies A.2,  satisfies A.1–
A.4, A.5.1, and A.6. Then by Theorems 3 and 5 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b),
 admits an ambiguity averse representation 〈u′, G〉, and the uniqueness property
of their representation implies that we can assume u′ = u. Moreover, they show that
G : R ×  → (−∞,∞] is given by, for each (t, p) ∈ R × ,
G(t, p) = sup{u(x f ) : f ∈ F , E pu( f ) ≤ t}. (48)
Fix p ∈ . Let t, t ′ ∈ R be such that t ≤ t ′. We want to show that G(t, p) − t ≤
G(t ′, p) − t ′. Let f ∈ F be such that E pu( f ) ≤ t . Since u is onto, there is f ′ ∈ F
satisfying that u( f ′) = u( f ) + (t ′ − t)1, so that E pu( f ′) ≤ t ′. Since u and I satisfy
(22), and since I is normalized and constant superadditive, u(x f ′) = I (u( f ′)) =
I (u( f )+(t ′− t)1) ≥ I (u( f ))+ t ′− t = u(x f )+ t ′− t . Thus, u(x f ′)− t ′ ≥ u(x f )− t .
Since for each f ∈ F such that E pu( f ) ≤ t , there is f ′ ∈ F such that E pu( f ′) ≤ t ′
and u(x f ′) − t ′ ≥ u(x f ) − t , by (48), G(t ′, p) − t ′ ≥ G(t, p) − t , as desired.
We now prove that statements 2, 3, and 4 all imply statement 1. Assume that 
admits a WM representation 〈u, D, λ〉 with the properties in statement 2. To show that
 satisfies A.1, A.3, A.4, A.5.1, and A.6, the same arguments for the necessity of the
axioms in the proof of Theorem 1 can be applied since they rely on the same properties
of u, D, and λ as we have here. Using the fact that for each ϕ ∈ RS , λ(ϕ + t1) is
non-increasing in t , it can be readily seen that  satisfies A.2.1.
Assume that  admits a VC representation 〈u, K , σ 〉 with the properties in state-
ment 3. To show that  satisfies A.1, A.3, A.4, and A.6, the same arguments for the
necessity of the axioms in the proof of Theorem 2 can be applied since they rely on the
same properties of u, K , and σ as we have here. Using the fact that for each ϕ ∈ RS ,
σ(ϕ + t1) is non-increasing in t , it can be readily seen that  satisfies A.2.1. Using
the fact that σ ∈ 	¯(K ), one can readily show that  satisfies A.5.1.
Assume that  admits an ambiguity averse representation 〈u, G〉 with the property
in statement 4. By Theorems 3 and 5 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b),  satisfies
A.1, A.3, A.4, A.5.1, and A.6. Using the fact that for each p ∈ , G(t, p) − t is
non-decreasing in t , one can readily show that  satisfies A.2.1. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5 Let  satisfies A.1, A.2.1, A.3, A.4, A.5.1, and A.6. Let
〈u, D, λ〉 be a canonical WM representation of  . It can be readily seen that A.2.1
implies A.2. Thus, by Theorem 1, D is the Bewley set, i.e., 〈u, D〉 is a Bewley rep-
resentation of the unambiguous preference relation  ∗ induced from  . Then by
Proposition 11 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b), D = cl(co( ⋃
f ∈F
π( f ))). To prove
that for each x ∈ X , D = cl(co( ⋃
f ∼x
π( f ))), it suffices to prove that for each pair
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y, z ∈ X , cl(co( ⋃
f ∼y
π( f ))) = cl(co( ⋃
f ∼z
π( f ))). Fix y, z ∈ X . Assume without loss
of generality that y  z.
Define I : RS → R by setting for each ϕ ∈ RS , I (ϕ) := λ(ϕ) min
p∈D E pϕ +
(1 − λ(ϕ)) max
p∈D E pϕ. By the similar arguments as in the proof of the necessity of
the axioms in Proposition 1 and in the first paragraph of the proof of Theorem 1, I
is non-decreasing, continuous, and quasi-concave. By the same arguments as in the
second paragraph of the proof of Lemma 3, I is constant superadditive.
For each x ∈ X and each ϕ ∈ RS , let tx (ϕ) ∈ R be such that I (ϕ− tx (ϕ)1) = u(x).
Since I is constant superadditive, tx (ϕ) is uniquely determined. For each x ∈ X , define
 x on F by setting for each pair f , g ∈ F ,
f  x g ⇐⇒ tx (u( f )) ≥ tx (u(g)).
Let ∼x denote its indifference component.
Fix x ∈ X . The following four observations about ∼x will be useful. First, for
each x ′ ∈ X , tx (u(x ′)) = u(x ′) − u(x), and in particular, tx (u(x)) = 0. This follows
immediately from the definitions of I and tx (u(x ′)). Second, for each f ∈ F ,
(i) x  f ⇐⇒ x  x f , and (i i) x ∼ f ⇐⇒ x ∼x f . (49)
To see (i) of (49), note that
x  f ⇐⇒ u(x) ≥ I (u( f )) ⇐⇒ 0 ≥ tx (u( f )) ⇐⇒ tx (u(x))
≥ tx (u( f )) ⇐⇒ x  x f ,
and by similar arguments, (i i) of (49) is true. Third, for each ϕ ∈ F and each c ∈ R,
tx (ϕ+c1) = tx (ϕ)+c. This is because I is constant superadditive and I (ϕ+c1−tx (ϕ+
c1)1) = u(x) = I (ϕ− tx (ϕ)1) = I (ϕ+c1−(tx (ϕ)+c)1). Fourth,  x satisfies A.1–
A.4, A.5.1, and A.6. By construction,  x satisfies A.1. Since u is affine and onto,
by the first observation, so is tx when restricted to constant vectors, and thus,  x
satisfies A.2 and A.6. Since I is continuous and quasi-concave, by routine arguments,
so is tx , and thus  x satisfies A.3 and A.5.1. Since I is constant superadditive, it can
also be readily seen that  x satisfies A.4.
For each x ∈ X , define πx : F ⇒  by setting for each f ∈ F ,
πx ( f ) :=
{
p ∈  :
∑
s∈S
ps f (s)  x
∑
s∈S
ps g(s) where g ∈ F implies f  x g
}
.
We claim that
⋃
f ∈F
πx ( f ) = ⋃
f ∼x
π( f ). We first show that ⋃
f ∼x
π( f ) ⊆ ⋃
f ∈F
πx ( f ).
Let x ∈ X , f ∈ F with f ∼ x , and p ∈ π( f ). We want to show that p ∈ πx ( f ). Let
g ∈ F be such that ∑
s∈S
ps f (s)  x
∑
s∈S
ps g(s). Then by the first observation in the pre-
vious paragraph,
∑
s∈S
ps f (s) 
∑
s∈S
ps g(s). Since p ∈ π( f ), ∑
s∈S
ps f (s) 
∑
s∈S
ps g(s)
implies f  g. Since f ∼ x and f  g, x  g. Since f ∼ x and x  g, by applying
the second observation in the previous paragraph twice, f  x g, as desired.
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We now show that
⋃
f ∈F
πx ( f ) ⊆ ⋃
f ∼x
π( f ). Let x ∈ X , f ∈ F , and p ∈ πx ( f ).
We need to show that there is f ′ ∈ F such that f ′ ∼ x and p ∈ π( f ′). Since u is
onto, we can pick f ′ ∈ F satisfying that
u( f ′) = u( f ) − tx (u( f ))1. (50)
Since I (u( f ′)) = I (u( f ) − tx (u( f ))1) = u(x), f ′ ∼ x . To show that p ∈ π( f ′), let
g′ ∈ F be such that ∑
s∈S
ps f ′(s) 
∑
s∈S
ps g′(s), and we need to show that f ′  g′, or
equivalently, x  g′. Since u is onto, we can pick g ∈ F satisfying that
u(g) = u(g′) + tx (u( f ))1. (51)
Since
∑
s∈S
ps f ′(s) 
∑
s∈S
ps g′(s) and u is affine,
∑
s∈S
psu( f ′(s)) ≥ ∑
s∈S
psu(g′(s)).
Thus, by (50) and (51), ∑
s∈S
psu( f (s))≥ ∑
s∈S
psu(g(s)). Hence,
∑
s∈S
ps f (s)
∑
s∈S
ps g(s).
Then by the first observation,
∑
s∈S
ps f (s)  x
∑
s∈S
ps g(s). Since p ∈ πx ( f ),
∑
s∈S
ps f (s)  x
∑
s∈S
ps g(s) implies f  x g, i.e., tx (u( f ))≥ tx (u(g)). Since tx (u( f )) ≥
tx (u(g)), by the third observation and by (50) and (51), tx (u( f ′)) ≥ tx (u(g′)), i.e.,
f ′  x g′. Since f ′ ∼ x , by the second observation, f ′ ∼x x . Thus, x  x g′, and again
by the second observation, x  g′, as desired.
Next, we claim that  z is more ambiguity averse than  y . To show this, let x ∈ X
and f ∈ F be such that x  y f . We need to show that x  z f . Since x  y f , by the
first observation, u(x) − u(y) = ty(u(x)) ≥ ty(u( f )). Since I (u( f ) − ty(u( f ))1) =
u(y) and u(x) − u(y) ≥ ty(u( f )), and since I is non-decreasing, I (u( f ) − (u(x) −
u(y))1) ≤ u(y). Thus, since I is constant superadditive and y  z,
I (u( f ) − (u(x) − u(z))1)
= I (u( f ) − (u(x) − u(y))1 − (u(y) − u(z))1)
≤ I (u( f ) − (u(x) − u(y))1) − (u(y) − u(z))
≤ u(y) − (u(y) − u(z)) = u(z).
Since I (u( f )−(u(x)−u(z))1) ≤ u(z) = I (u( f )−tz(u( f ))1), and since I is constant
superadditive, u(x) − u(z) ≥ tz(u( f )). Thus, by the first observation, tz(u(x)) =
u(x) − u(z) ≥ tz(u( f )), i.e., x  z f , as desired.
Since  z is more ambiguity averse than  y , by Propositions 6 and 11
and Theorem 10 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b), and by the first observation,
cl(co(
⋃
f ∈F
πy( f ))) ⊆ cl(co( ⋃
f ∈F
πz( f ))).30 We have shown that for each x ∈ X ,
⋃
f ∈F
πx ( f ) = ⋃
f ∼x
π( f ). Thus, cl(co( ⋃
f ∼y
π( f ))) ⊆ cl(co( ⋃
f ∼z
π( f ))).
30 Under A.1–A.4, the definition of a more ambiguity averse preference adopted in this paper is equivalent
to that adopted by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b).
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Conversely, we show that cl(co(
⋃
f ∼z
π( f ))) ⊆ cl(co( ⋃
f ∼y
π( f ))). It is sufficient
to show that
⋃
f ∼z
π( f ) ⊆ cl(co( ⋃
f ∼y
π( f ))). Suppose to the contrary that there exist
g ∈ F with g ∼ z and q ∈ π(g)\cl(co( ⋃
f ∼y
π( f ))). Then by a standard separation
theorem, there is ϕ ∈ RS such that for each p ∈ cl(co( ⋃
f ∼y
π( f ))), Eqϕ < 0 <
E pϕ. Pick n ∈ N such that Eqnϕ < Equ(g) and for each p ∈ cl(co( ⋃
f ∼y
π( f ))),
E pnϕ > u(y). Let h ∈ F be such that u(h) = nϕ. Since Equ(g) > Eqnϕ =
Equ(h), and since q ∈ π(g), g  h. Since g ∼ z and g  h, z  h. By the fourth
observation,  y satisfies A.1–A.4, A.5.1, and A.6. Thus, by the first observation
and by applying Proposition 11 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b) for  y , if for each
p ∈ cl(co( ⋃
f ∈F
πy( f ))), E pu(h) ≥ u(y), then h  ∗y y, where  ∗ is the unambiguous
preference relation induced from  y . Since cl(co(
⋃
f ∈F
πy( f ))) = cl(co( ⋃
f ∼y
π( f ))),
and since for each p ∈ cl(co( ⋃
f ∼y
π( f ))), E pu(h) = E pnϕ > u(y), h  ∗y y, which
in particular implies that h  y. Since h  y and y  z, h  z, which contradicts that
z  h, as desired. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6 Let  satisfy A.1–A.4, and A.6. We first prove the sufficiency
of A.2.3. Assume that  also satisfies A.2.3. By Lemma 1, there exist an affine onto
utility function u : X → R and a normalized, monotone, and continuous functional
I : RS → R satisfying (22).
We claim that I is constant additive. Since  satisfies A.2.3, by the similar argu-
ments as in the second paragraph of the proof of Lemma 3, for each ϕ ∈ RS and each
t ∈ R, I (ϕ + t1) ≥ I (ϕ) + t , and hence I ((ϕ + t1) − t1) ≥ I (ϕ + t1) − t . Then for
each ϕ ∈ RS and each t ∈ R,
I (ϕ + t1) ≥ I (ϕ) + t = I (ϕ + t1 − t1) + t ≥ I (ϕ + t1),
which implies that I (ϕ + t1) = I (ϕ) + t , as desired.
Let α ∈ (0, 1), x, y ∈ X , and f , g ∈ F be such that f g and α f +(1−α)x  αg+
(1 − α)x . Thus, since u is affine and I satisfies 22, I (αu( f ) + (1 − α)u(x)) ≥
I (αu(g) + (1 − α)u(x)). Then since I is constant additive,
I (αu( f ) + (1 − α)u(y))
= I (αu( f ) + (1 − α)u(x)) + (1 − α)(u(y) − u(x))
≥ I (αu(g) + (1 − α)u(x)) + (1 − α)(u(y) − u(x))
= I (αu(g) + (1 − α)u(y)).
Hence, α f + (1 − α)y  αg + (1 − α)y, as desired.
The necessity of A.2.3 follows from the fact that for each f ∈ F and z ∈ X , f  z,
which can be readily seen by definition. unionsq
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Proof of Proposition 7 Let u : R → R be an affine onto function and φ : R → R
an increasing, concave, and twice differentiable function. For each countably additive
Borel probability measure μ on , define Iμ : RS → R by setting for each ϕ ∈ R,
Iμ(ϕ) := φ−1
⎛
⎜
⎝
∫
p∈
φ(E pϕ)dμ(p)
⎞
⎟
⎠ .
By definition, I is normalized.
To show the “if” direction, assume that −φ′′
φ′ is non-increasing. Let  admit a
smooth ambiguity representation 〈u, φ, μ〉 for some countably additive Borel probabil-
ity measure μ on . We want to show that  satisfies A.2.1. Since 〈u, φ, μ〉 represents
 , I satisfies (22). By the analogous version of Lemma 52 in Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
(2011b), and by the analogous arguments as in the proof of their Proposition 53, I is
constant superadditive. It can be readily seen that since I satisfies (22), and since I is
normalized and constant superadditive,  satisfies A.2.1.
Conversely, assume that each preference relation that admits a smooth ambiguity
representation 〈u, φ, μ〉 for some countably additive Borel probability measure μ on
 satisfies A.2.1. We want to show that −φ′′
φ′ is non-increasing. By the analogous
version of Lemma 52 in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b), it is equivalent to show that
for each t ∈ R+, Jt : φ(R) → R, defined by setting for each c ∈ φ(R),
Jt (c) = φ[φ−1(c) + t],
is convex on φ(R). Note that since φ is increasing, φ−1 is well-defined. Let c, c′ ∈
φ(R) and α ∈ [0, 1]. Let x, x ′ ∈ X be such that φ(u(x)) = c and φ(u(x ′)) = c′.
Let s, s′ ∈ S and f ∈ F be such that f (s) = x and f (s′) = x ′. Let δs and δs′ be
the degenerate probability measures which assign probability one, respectively, to s
and s′. Let μ be a probability measure on  which assigns probability α to δs and
1 − α to δs′ . Let  admit the smooth ambiguity representation 〈u, φ, μ〉. Then 
satisfies A.2.1. By the similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 3, Iμ is constant
superadditive. Then for each t ∈ R+ and each α ∈ [0, 1],
Jt (αc + (1 − α)c′) = Jt (αφ(u( f (s))) + (1 − α)φ(u( f (s′))))
= Jt
⎛
⎜
⎝
∫
p∈
φ(E pu( f ))dμ(p)
⎞
⎟
⎠ = φ[Iμ(u( f )) + t] ≤ φ[Iμ(u( f ) + t1)]
=
∫
φ(E p(u( f ) + t1))dμ(p) = αφ(u(x) + t) + (1 − α)φ(u(x ′) + t)
= αφ[φ−1(c) + t] + (1 − α)φ[φ−1(c′) + t] = α Jt (c) + (1 − α)Jt (c′),
as desired.
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Similarly, it can be shown that each preference relation that admits a smooth ambi-
guity representation 〈u, φ, μ〉 for some countably additive Borel probability measure
μ on  satisfies A.2.2 if and only if −φ′′
φ′ is non-decreasing. unionsq
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